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Abstract: This paper develops a Walrasian equilibrium theory of establish-
ment dynamics and matching frictions and uses it to analyze business cycle ﬂuctu-
ations. Two scenarios are considered: one in which the matching process is subject
to congestion externalities and another in which it is not. The paper ﬁnds that
the scenario with congestion externalities replicates U.S. business cycle dynamics
much better than the scenario with eﬃcient matching. Reallocation shocks im-
prove the empirical behavior of the model in terms of microeconomic adjustments
but have little consequences for aggregate dynamics.
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The purpose of this paper is to evaluate if standard neoclassical theory can be used to explain the observed behavior of
establishment dynamics, vacancies and unemployment both at growth and business cycle frequencies. To this end, the
paper constructs a real business cycle model that blends three important strands in the literature: 1) the Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (15) model of establishment dynamics, 2) the Mortensen and Pissarides (18) matching model, and 3) the Lucas
and Prescott (16) islands model. A key feature of the model is that it fully relies on classical price theory: All prices,
including that of labor, are determined in Walrasian markets.
The economy is populated by a representative household that values consumption and leisure. Output, which can be
consumed or invested, is produced by a large number of spatially separated establishments that are subject to aggregate and
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The amount of hiring that an establishment can undertake is constrained by the number
of recruitment opportunities that it has available. Unemployed workers can become employed only if they gain employment
opportunities. Recruitment opportunities for establishments and employment opportunities for workers are jointly produced
by a neoclassical recruitment technology that uses unemployed workers and the consumption good as inputs of production.
Following the matching literature, the recruitment technology is allowed to be subject to production externalities: The total
number of unemployed workers in the economy and the aggregate amount of recruitment expenditures aﬀect its productivity.
Any of the workers with employment opportunities can be hired by any of the establishments with recruitment opportunities.
The paper deﬁnes and fully characterizes a recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy. It shows that an
equilibrium can be constructed by solving a social planning problem with side conditions. The social planner solves a
standard utility maximization problem subject to feasibility constraints, except that it takes as given the total number
of unemployed workers and the aggregate amount of recruitment expenditures that enter the recruitment technology as
external eﬀects. At equilibrium, these variables must be generated by the social planner’s optimal decision rules. The
recruitment opportunities and employment decision rules of the establishments are also characterized. In particular, they
are shown to be of the (S,s) variety. This, together with the assumptions that the idiosyncratic productivity shocks take
a ﬁnite number of values and that the aggregate productivity shocks are suﬃciently small, implies that the distribution
over establishment types has a ﬁnite support. As a consequence, the social planner’s problem can be formulated in terms
of a ﬁnite number of state and decision variables. This is an important result: Despite the model’s complexity, simple
linear-quadratic methods can be used for computing a recursive competitive equilibrium.
The paper then evaluates how well the model is able to explain the data. Two versions are considered: A version
without external eﬀects in the recruitment technology and a version with external eﬀects. Both versions are calibrated to
identical U.S. long-run observations. Some parameter values are closely related to the neoclassical growth model and are
calibrated to reproduce similar observations (e.g. the capital/output ratio, the investment/output ratio, etc.). The rest of
the parameters are chosen to reproduce observations on establishment dynamics (e.g. the size distribution of establishments,
j o bc r e a t i o na n dd e s t r u c t i o nr a t e s ,e t c . ) ,w o r k e rﬂows (e.g. the separation rates, the hazard rate from unemployment, etc.),
and vacancies (e.g. the vacancy rate, recruitment costs, etc.). When an aggregate productivity shock of empirically relevant
magnitude is introduced, the paper ﬁnds that the version without external eﬀects in the recruitment technology fails to
reproduce the data: The aggregate ﬂuctuations that it generates are too small. On the contrary, the version with external
1eﬀects generates aggregate ﬂuctuations of reasonable magnitude. Thus the paper indicates that, when looked through the
eyes of neoclassical theory, there is empirical support for the hypothesis of congestion externalities in the matching process.
While the paper has a strong empirical focus it also makes a theoretical contribution to the literature on equilibrium
unemployment. This literature has been dominated by two main strands: the Mortensen-Pissarides (18) matching model
and the Lucas-Prescott (16) islands model. The Mortensen-Pissarides model is extremely useful for analyzing vacancies and
unemployment and has been extended to incorporate business cycle ﬂuctuations (e.g. Andolfatto (4), Merz (17), Shimer
(20), Hall (13), Hagedorn and Manovskii (9), etc.) and, more recently, establishment dynamics (e.g. Acemoglu and Hawkins
(1), Cooper et. al (6), etc.). However, the model has a signiﬁcant drawback: It introduces free parameters in the wage
determination process. Even in the simplest version of the model it is unclear what value to use for the Nash bargaining
parameter. In versions with aggregate ﬂuctuations and establishment dynamics, the degrees of freedom multiply since it
is possible for the Nash bargaining parameter to vary systematically with the state of the economy or of an individual
establishment. The Lucas-Prescott model does not suﬀer from these diﬃculties since wages are determined in Walrasian
markets.1 However, there is no notion of vacancies in that model: Firms behave as if they could hire any number of workers
at the island speciﬁc competitive wage rate. That is, ﬁrms do not need to undertake any type of active recruitment eﬀort
in order to ﬁll their job openings. This paper avoids these limitations: By blending together the Mortensen-Pissarides
model and the Lucas-Prescott model, it delivers a framework for analyzing vacancies and unemployment in which all prices
are fully determined by preferences and technology. Incorporating the Hopenhayn-Rogerson model is also important since
establishments dynamics are the counterpart to worker ﬂows and vacancies. The result is a comprehensive theory of labor
market dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economy. Section 3 describes a recursive competitive
equilibrium. Section 4 characterizes a recursive competitive equilibrium and describes how to compute it. Section 5
calibrates the two versions of the model. Finally, Section 6 presents the results. An appendix provides proofs to the most
important claims made in the paper.
2 The economy
The economy is endowed with a measure one of workers. A worker is a capital good that does not depreciate and can
not be produced. During any period of time a worker can be in either of two states: employed or unemployed.E m p l o y e d
workers produce the consumption good while unemployed workers produce home goods. Employed workers can be freely
transformed into unemployed workers. However, unemployed workers can only be transformed into employed workers using
a costly technology. All workers are subject to an idiosyncratic productivity shock called a quit shock, that makes them
temporarily unproductive as employed workers. A worker that quits needs to spend a full period of time unemployed before
regaining his productive capacity. The probability that a worker quits at the beginning of the following period depends on
his current employment status: It is equal to πn if the worker is currently employed and it is equal to πu if the worker is
1The Lucas-Prescott model has been used, among other things, to study the eﬀects of labor market policies (e.g. Alvarez and Veracierto
(3)), business cycle dynamics (e.g. Veracierto (23)), occupational mobility (e.g. Kambourov and Manovskii (11)), and rest unemployment (e.g.
Alvarez and Shimer (2)).
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where Ct is consumption, Ut is the total number of unemployed workers, ϕ>0, σ>0 and 0 <β<1.
The consumption good is produced by a large number of establishments. Each establishment has a production function
given by
yt = eztstF (nt,k t),
where zt is an aggregate productivity shock, st is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, nt is the number of employed workers,
kt is physical capital, and F is a continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave and decreasing returns to
scale production function that satisﬁes the Inada conditions. The idiosyncratic productivity shock st t a k e sv a l u e si na
ﬁnite set S and follows a Markov process with monotone transition matrix Q. Realizations of st are independent across
establishments and st =0is an absorbing state. Since there are no ﬁxed costs of operation, exit takes place only when the
idiosyncratic productivity level becomes zero. In every period of time a measure   of new establishments is exogenously
born. Their distribution over initial productivity shocks is given by ψ. The aggregate productivity shock follows an AR(1)
process given by
zt+1 = ρzt + εt+1, (2)
where 0 ≤ ρ<1, and εt+1 is i.i.d., normally distributed, with variance σ2
ε and zero mean.
The number of employed workers nt at an establishment is given by
nt = nt−1 + ht − ft,
where ht are the gross employment increases (i.e. hirings)a n dft are the gross employment reductions (i.e. ﬁrings). All the
workers that are ﬁred become unemployed. Because of the exogenous quit of employed workers, ft is eﬀectively constrained
as follows
πnnt−1 ≤ ft ≤ nt−1.
The number of new hires ht is limited by the number of recruiting opportunities jt that the establishment has at the
beginning of the period, i.e.
ht ≤ jt. (3)
Unemployed workers can become employed only if they are transformed into workers with employment opportunities.
Workers with employment opportunities et+1 and recruiting opportunities jt+1 are jointly produced using the following
recruitment technology:
et+1 = G(at,u t,A t,U t), (4)
jt+1 = H(at,u t,A t,U t), (5)
3where at are recruitment expenditures (in the consumption good), ut are unemployed workers, At is the aggregate amount
of recruitment expenditures in the economy, and Ut is the total number of unemployed workers in the economy.2
The recruitment technology satisﬁes the following assumptions: 1) G and H are continuously diﬀerentiable, 2) G and
H are increasing in (at,u t),3 )G and H are homogenous of degree one with respect to (at,u t) and homogeneous of degree
zero with respect to (At,U t),4 )G and H are concave in (at,u t),5 )a n dG satisﬁes that
G(at,u t,A t,U t) ≤ ut, for every (at,u t,A t,U t).( 6 )
Observe from equation (6) that not all unemployed workers that enter the recruitment technology are transformed into
workers with employment opportunities:
xt+1 = ut − G(at,u t,A t,U t),
is the number of unsuccessful candidates that the recruitment technology generates.
3 Recursive competitive equilibrium
The state of the economy is given by the quintuple (z,K,E,X,μ),w h e r ez is the aggregate productivity level, K is the
aggregate stock of capital, E is the aggregate number of workers with employment opportunities, X is the aggregate number
of unsuccessful candidates, μ(s,l × j) is a measure of establishments over individual states (s,l,j),a n d(E,X,μ) satisﬁes
that3
Z
lμ(s,dl × dj)+E + X =1 . (7)
There are three competitive sectors in the economy: a households sector, an establishments sector, and a recruitment
industry.
Households earn income from renting capital to the establishments and from the aggregate proﬁts made by the es-
tablishments sector.4 They spend their income on consumption, on investment and on renting unemployed workers. The
individual state of a household is the amount of capital that it owns κ. The household’s problem is described by the
following Bellman equation:









c + i + ru (z,K,E,X,μ)m ≤ rk (z,K,E,X,μ)κ + Π(z,K,E,X,μ), (9)
κ0 =( 1 − δ)κ + i (10)
(K0,E0,X0,μ 0)=L(z,K,E,X,μ). (11)
2Observe that when GA, GU, HA or HU are strictly positive, the recruitment technology is subject to production externalities.
3Equation (7) implies that either E or X could be removed from the aggregate state vector. However, this would complicate the deﬁnition of
a recursive competitive equilibrium.
4Each household is assumed to own one share of each establishment in the economy.
4where ru is the rental rate of an unemployed worker, rk is the rental rate of capital, Π are the aggregate proﬁts made
by the establishments sector, i is investment, m is the number of unemployed workers that the household rents, and L is
the law of motion for the endogenous state of the economy. Equation (9) is the budget constraint of the household, and
equation (10) is the law of motion for its stock of capital. The household’s optimal decisions are c = c(κ,z,K,E,X,μ),
i = i(κ,z,K,E,X,μ),a n dm = m(κ,z,K,E,X,μ) for consumption, investment and unemployed workers, respectively.
The establishments rent capital, purchase workers with employment opportunities (up to the number of recruitment
opportunities that they have at the beginning of the period), sell unemployed workers (up to their previous-period em-
ployment level), and purchase next-period recruitment opportunities. The individual state of an establishment is given by
at r i p l e(s,l,j),w h e r es is its current idiosyncratic productivity level, l is its previous-period employment level and j is
its recruitment opportunities at the beginning of the period. The establishment’s problem is described by the following
Bellman equation:
W(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)= m a x
{f,h,k,n,v}
{ezsF (n,k)+pu (z,K,E,X,μ)f − pe (z,K,E,X,μ)h (12)









n = l + h − f (13)
πnl ≤ f (14)
f ≤ l (15)
h ≤ j (16)
l0 = n (17)
j0 = v (18)
(K0,E0,X0,μ 0)=L(z,K,E,X,μ). (19)
where pu is the price of an unemployed worker, pe is the price of a worker with employment opportunities, pv is the price of
a next-period recruitment opportunity, q (·,z0) is the price of an Arrow security that delivers one unit of the consumption
good if the next-period aggregate productivity level is equal to z0, n is the number of employed workers, k is the capital
level, f are the ﬁrings, h are the hirings, and v are the purchases of next-period recruitment opportunities. The constraints
(13)-(16) have been described in the previous section. The establishment’s optimal decisions are n = n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),
k = k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), f = f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), h = h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),a n dv = v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),f o r
employed workers, capital, ﬁrings, hirings and next-period recruitment opportunities, respectively.
The recruitment companies sell workers with employment opportunities and next-period recruitment opportunities.
They also buy and sell unemployed workers and rent them to the households sector. The individual state of a recruitment
company is a pair (e,x),w h e r ee is its number of workers with employment opportunities at the beginning of the period,
5and x is its number of unsuccessful candidates. The problem of a recruitment company is given as follows:
R(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)= m a x
{a,b,d,u}
{pe (z,K,E,X,μ)d + pv (z,K,E,X,μ)b (20)
+pu (z,K,E,X,μ)[x + e − d − u]+ru (z,K,E,X,μ)u − a
+E [q(z,K,E,X,μ,z0)R(e0,x 0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0) | z]}
subject to
d ≤ (1 − πu)e
b = H(a,u,A,U)
e0 = G(a,u,A,U)
x0 = u − G(a,u,A,U)
A = A(z,K,E,X,μ)
U = U (z,K,E,X,μ)
(K0,E0,X0,μ 0)=L(z,K,E,X,μ).
where d is the number of workers with employment opportunities that the recruitment company sells, b is the number of
next-period recruitment opportunities that the recruitment company sells, u is the number of unemployed workers that the
recruitment company owns, a are the expenditures that the recruitment company makes, A are the aggregate recruitment
expenditures in the economy, and U is the aggregate number of unemployed workers. Observe that, since unemployed
w o r k e r sq u i ta tt h er a t eπu, d cannot exceed (1 − πu)e. Also observe that the recruitment company can sell as unemployed
workers all of its unsuccessful candidates x and any of its unsold workers with employment opportunities e − d.T h e
recruitment company’s optimal decisions are a = a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ), b = b(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ), d = d(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),
and u = u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ), for recruitment expenditures, next-period recruitment opportunities, sales of workers with
employment opportunities, and unemployed workers, respectively.5
A recursive competitive equilibrium can now be deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 1 A recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE) is a set of value functions B(κ,z,K,E, X,μ), W(s,l,j,z,K,E,
X,μ), R(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ), a set of individual decision rules c(κ,z,K,E,X, μ), i(κ,z,K,E,X,μ), m(κ,z,K,E,X,μ),
n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), k(s,l,j,z,K,E, X,μ), f(s,l,j,z, K,E,X,μ), h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), a(e,x,z,
K,E,X,μ), b(e,x,z, K,E,X,μ), d(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ), u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ), a pair of aggregate decision rules A(z,K,E,X,
μ), U(z, K,E,X,μ), an aggregate law of motion L(z,K,E,X,μ), an aggregate proﬁts function Π(z,K,E,X, μ),a n das e to f
price functions rk (z,K,E,X,μ), ru (z,K,E,X,μ), pu (z,K,E,X,μ), pe(z,K,E,X, μ), pv (z,K,E,X,μ), q(z,K,E,X,μ,
z0),s u c ht h a t :
(i) the value function B (κ,z,K,E,X,μ) solves the households’ Bellman equation and c(κ,z,K, E,X,μ), i(κ,z,K,E,X,
μ),a n dm(κ,z,K,E,X,μ) are the associated decision rules,
5Sections 1.1-1.3 in the Technical Appendix provide ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions for the household, establishment and recruitment
company’s decision problems, respectively.
6(ii) the value function W(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) solves the establishments’ Bellman equation and n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),
k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),a n dv(s, l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) are the associated decision
rules,
(iii) the value function R(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ) solves the Bellman equation of the recruitment companies and a(e,x,z,K,E,
X,μ), b(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ), d(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),a n du(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ) are the associated decision rules,













(vi) the rental market for unemployed workers clears, i.e.
u(E,X,z,K,E,X,μ)=m(K,z,K,E,X,μ)
(vii) the ownership market for unemployed workers clears, i.e.
























ezsF [n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)]μ(s,dl × dj)
(xi) the aggregate decision rules are generated by the optimal individual decisions, i.e.
A(z,K,E,X,μ)=a(E,X,z,K,E,X,μ)
U (z,K,E,X,μ)=u(E,X,z,K,E,X,μ)
(xii) the aggregate law of motion is generated by the optimal individual decisions, i.e.
(K0,E0,X0,μ 0)=L(z,K,E,X,μ)
7is given as follows:
K0 =( 1− δ)K + i(K,z,K,E,X,μ)
E0 = G[a(E,X,z,K,E,X,μ),u(E,X,z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ)]






Q(s,s0)μ(s,dl × dj)+ ψ (s0)I (L×J)
where
B(s,L×J)={(l,j):n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ∈ L and v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ∈ J}
and where I (L×J) is an indicator function which takes a value of one if (0,0) ∈ L×J, and a value of zero otherwise.6
4 Characterization and computation of a RCE
Due to the external eﬀects in the recruitment technology a RCE is generally ineﬃcient and must be solved for directly.
The high dimensionality of the sate space makes this a daunting task. However, it can be simpliﬁed considerably. This
section provides a solution method that can be easily implemented in actual computations. The method relies on two
key properties of a RCE. First, that it can be characterized as the solution to a dynamic programming problem with side
conditions.7 Second, that in a neighborhood of the deterministic steady state, the dynamic programming problem can be
represented as having a ﬁnite number of state and decision variables. The following subsections explain these properties in
detail.
4.1 The myopic social planner’s problem
Consider the problem of a social planner that seeks to maximize utility subject to the economy’s feasibility constraints.
However, the social planner is myopic in the sense that he does not fully internalize the eﬀects of his decisions on the output








A,U, ˆ A, ˆ U
´
where E0 are next-period workers with employment opportunities, J0 are next-period recruitment opportunities, A are
recruitment expenditures, U are unemployed workers, and ˆ A and ˆ U are exogenous productivity shocks. The shocks ˆ A and
ˆ U evolve according to the following stochastic process:
ˆ A = ˆ A
³
z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
6It is straightforward to verify that if (E,X,μ) satisfy equation (7), then (E0,X0,μ 0) also satisfy equation (7).
7The dynamic optimization problem depends on exogenous parameters, wich in turn depend on the solution to the dynamic optimization
problem. Finding a RCE is then reduced to solving a ﬁxed point problem on those parameters. This basic strategy for solving for a competitive
equilibrium in an economy with externalities is already familiar to the literature, though in much simpler contexts (e.g. Kehoe, Levine and
Romer (12), Jones and Manuelli (10), etc.).
8ˆ U = ˆ U
³
z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
³





z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
where z is the aggregate productivity level, and
³
ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
are variables that lie in the same space as (K,E,X,μ).
The state of the myopic social planner is then given by the state of the economy (z,K,E,X,μ) and by the variables
³
ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
,w h i c ha r es u ﬃcient statistics for predicting the future behavior of ˆ A and ˆ U. The problem of the myopic
social planner facing a stochastic process
³
ˆ A, ˆ U,ˆ L
´
is described by the following Bellman equation:



























v(s,l,j)μ(s,dl × dj) ≤ H
³
A,U, ˆ A, ˆ U
´
(24)












h(s,l,j)μ(s,dl × dj) ≤ (1 − πu)E (26)
n(s,l,j)=l + h(s,l,j) − f (s,l,j) (27)
h(s,l,j) ≤ j (28)
πnl ≤ f (s,l,j) (29)
f (s,l,j) ≤ l (30)
K0 =( 1− δ)K + I (31)
E0 = G
³
A,U, ˆ A, ˆ U
´
(32)
X0 = U − G
³







{(l,j): n(s,l,j)∈L and v(s,l,j)∈J}
Q(s,s0)μ(s,dl × dj)+ ψ (s0)I (L×J) (34)
ˆ A = ˆ A
³
z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
(35)
ˆ U = ˆ U
³









z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
. (37)
9where equations (22)-(34) are feasibility constraints and equations (35)-(37) describe the stochastic process that ˆ A and ˆ U fol-
low over time.8 The myopic social planner’s decision rules are C = Cm
³
z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, I = Im(z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K,
ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), n = nm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), k = km
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, f = fm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K,
ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), h = hm
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, v = vm
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, U = Um(z,K,E,X, μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,
ˆ μ), A = Am
³
z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, for consumption, investment, establishment employment, establishment capital,
establishment ﬁrings, establishment hirings, establishment recruitment opportunities, unemployment and recruitment ex-
penditures, respectively.
The following proposition provides a characterization of the decision rules to the myopic social planner’s problem.
Proposition 2 Let {Cm,Im,n m,km,fm,h m,vm,Um,A m} be the solution to the MSP’s with exogenous stochastic process
³
ˆ A, ˆ U,ˆ L
´
. Then, there exist thresholds nm(s,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), ¯ nm(s,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) and ¯ vm(s,z,K,E,X,
μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) and a shadow capital price function rk
³
z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
such that, for every s>0 and l + j>0:

















vm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ)=m a x
n
¯ vm(s,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) − (1 − πn)nm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ),0
o
,
hm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ)=m a x
n
nm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) − l,0
o
fm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ)=m a x
n








z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
,
Proof. In the economy in which
³
ˆ A, ˆ U,ˆ L
´
truly represent exogenous productivity shocks to the recruitment technol-
ogy, the Welfare Theorems apply. In this case the problem described by equation (21) is the social planner’s problem
and its solution can be decentralized as a recursive competitive equilibrium in which prices are functions of the state
(z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ). The claim then follows from characterizing the optimal decision rules to the associated es-
tablishments’ problem given by equation (12).9
This proposition is important because it can be used to reduce the dimensionality of the decision variables in the myopic
social planner’s problem: Instead of choosing functions nm, vm, hm, fm and km deﬁned over the inﬁnite number of triples
(s,l,j), the myopic social planner can be restricted to choose thresholds nm, ¯ nm and ¯ vm deﬁned over the ﬁnite number of
singletons s.
The next proposition states that if the solution to a myopic planner’s problem satisﬁes certain side conditions, then it
is a RCE.
8Observe that if equations (35)-(37) were substituted by ˆ A = A and ˆ U = U, the solution to this planning problem would be the Pareto optimal
allocation.
9For details see Sections 2 in the Technical Appendix.
10Proposition 3 Let {Cm,Im,n m,km,fm,h m,vm,Um,A m} be the solution to the myopic social planner’s problem with
exogenous stochastic process
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ˆ U (z,K,E,X,μ)=Um (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ).
In addition, suppose that
³





ˆ K0 =( 1− δ)K + Im (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),
ˆ E0 = G [Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),
Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)],







Q(s,s0)μ(s,dl × dj)+ ψ (s0)I (L×J),
where
B(s,L×J)={(l,j):nm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) ∈ L and vm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) ∈ J}.









Proof. It follows from comparing the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a RCE with the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions to the myopic social planner’s problem.10
10For the details, see Section 3.4 in the Technical Appendix.
114.2 State space characterization
When there are no aggregate productivity shocks to the economy (i.e. when z is identical to zero), a deterministic steady
state can be deﬁned. In particular, a myopic steady state is given by an aggregate state (K∗,E∗,X∗,μ ∗, ˆ K∗, ˆ E∗, ˆ X∗, ˆ μ
∗)
that replicates itself under the myopic planner’s optimal decision rules.11 Characterizing the invariant distribution μ∗ of a
myopic steady state will turn to be crucial for characterizing the state-space when the economy is subject to small aggregate
productivity shocks.












min{(1 − πn)l + j,n∗(s)},





v∗(s,l,j)=m a x{¯ v∗(s) − (1 − πn)n∗(s,l,j),0}. (39)
The following proposition characterizes a support to the invariant distribution μ∗ in terms of the ﬁnite number of steady
state thresholds n∗, ¯ n∗ and ¯ v∗.12
Proposition 4 Let M be a natural number satisfying that
(1 − πn)
M max{¯ n∗ (smax), ¯ v∗ (smax)} < min{n∗ (smin), ¯ v∗ (smin)}. (40)










k n∗ (s),(1 − πn)
k ¯ n∗ (s),(1 − πn)






(s,l,j): s ∈ S, l ∈ N ∗,a n dj ∈∪
s0∈S








is a support of the invariant distribution μ∗.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Observe that Proposition 4 not only constructs a support P∗ for the invariant distribution μ∗, but determines that it is
a ﬁnite set.
In order to analyze oﬀ-steady state dynamics it will be useful to deﬁne nt, ¯ nt,a n d¯ vt, as the threshold functions chosen
at date t. In addition, it will be useful to deﬁne the following minimum distance:
ε =m i n |a − b| (41)
11From Proposition 3 we know that if (K∗,E∗,X∗,μ ∗)=(ˆ K∗, ˆ E∗, ˆ X∗, ˆ μ∗), this myopic steady-state constitutes a steady-state equilibrium.
See Sections 4.1 and 4.3 in the Technical Appendix for explicit steady state equillibrium conditions and a computational algorithm.
12In the statement of the proposition smax and smin denote the largest and smallest positive values for s, respectively.
12subject to
a,b ∈ D∗ and a 6= b,
where






M n∗ (s),(1 − πn)
M ¯ n∗ (s),(1 − πn)
M ¯ v∗ (s)
o¾
.
The following proposition characterizes the distribution μt+1 under the assumptions that μt and the ﬁnite history of
thresholds
©
nt−k, ¯ nt−k, ¯ vt−k
ªM+1
k=0 are suﬃciently close to their steady-state counterparts.
Proposition 5 Let M be deﬁned by equation (40) and ε by equation (41).
Suppose that
¯ ¯nt−k (s) − n∗ (s)
¯ ¯ <ε / 2, (42)
|¯ nt−k (s) − ¯ n∗ (s)| <ε / 2, (43)
|¯ vt−k (s) − ¯ v∗ (s)| <ε / 2, (44)
for every s and every 0 ≤ k ≤ M +1 .
Suppose that the distribution μt has a ﬁnite support Pt given by
Pt =
½
(s,l,j): s ∈ S, l ∈ Nt,a n dj ∈∪
s0∈S



















k nt−k−1 (s),(1 − πn)
k ¯ nt−k−1 (s),(1 − πn)
k ¯ vt−k−2 (s)
o¾
∪ {0}. (46)
In addition, suppose that for every (s,l,j) ∈ Pt:
μt (s,l,j)=μ∗ (s,l∗,j∗), (47)
where (s,l∗,j∗) i st h eu n i q u ee l e m e n to fP∗ satisfying that |l − l∗| <ε / 2 and |j − j∗| <ε / 2+( 1− π)ε/2.
Then, the distribution μt+1 has a ﬁnite support Pt+1 given by
Pt+1 =
½
(s,l,j): s ∈ S, l ∈ Nt+1,a n dj ∈∪
s0∈S


















k nt−k (s),(1 − πn)
k ¯ nt−k (s),(1 − πn)
k ¯ vt−k−1 (s)
o¾
∪ {0}.
Moreover, for every (s,l,j) ∈ Pt+1:
μt+1 (s,l,j)=μ∗ (s,l∗,j∗)
where (s,l∗,j∗) i st h eu n i q u ee l e m e n to fP∗ satisfying that |l − l∗| <ε / 2 and |j − j∗| <ε / 2+( 1− π)ε/2.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 5 plays a crucial role in the solution method to be described below. It implies that if the economy starts
at the deterministic steady-state at t =0and the thresholds nt, ¯ nt and ¯ vt thereafter ﬂuctuate within a suﬃciently small
neighborhood of their steady state values, then the distribution μt will always have a ﬁnite support Pt determined by the
13ﬁnite history of thresholds
©
nt−k, ¯ nt−k, ¯ vt−k
ªM+1
k=1 (equations 45 and 46) and its mass at each point in Pt will be given
by the mass of the invariant distribution μ∗ at the corresponding point in P∗ (equation 47). As a result the state to the
myopic planner problem can be deﬁn e di nt e r m so ft h eﬁnite history of thresholds
©
nt−k, ¯ nt−k, ¯ vt−k
ªM+1
k=1 instead of the
distribution μt.
4.3 Solution method
This section redeﬁnes the myopic social planner’s problem so that standard solution methods can be applied. For this
purpose, it will be convenient to return to a recursive formulation and deﬁne nk, ¯ nk and ¯ vk as the thresholds that were
chosen k periods ago (relative to the current period).
Recall from Section 4.2 that the ﬁnite history {nk, ¯ nk, ¯ vk}
M+1
k=1 can be used to construct the current distribution μ
(as long as ﬂuctuations are suﬃciently small). Moreover, Proposition 2 states that the current thresholds (n0, ¯ n0, ¯ v0)
fully describe the employment rule n, the vacancies rule v, the hiring rule h and the ﬁring rule f. In turn, the employ-
ment decision rule n and the aggregate stock of capital K are suﬃcient for determining the capital allocation rule k.13
This suggests that the state vector (z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) in the myopic planner’s problem can be replaced by the
vector (z,K,E,{nk, ¯ nk, ¯ vk}
M+1
k=1 , ˆ K, ˆ E,
©
b nk,b ¯ nk,b ¯ vk
ªM+1
k=1 ) and that the decision variables (k,n,v,h,f) can be replaced by
(n0, ¯ n0, ¯ v0).14
Also, observe from equation (32) that A can be written as A = g1
³
E0,U, ˆ A, ˆ U
´
for some diﬀerentiable function g1
and, since at equilibrium A = b A and U = b U,t h a t ˆ A can be written as ˆ A = g2
³
b E0, b U
´
for some diﬀerentiable function
g2. Moreover, at equilibrium we have that U =1−
R
nd μand that b U =1−
R
b nd b μ. Substituting these expressions and
equations (22)-(33) into the return function in equation (21), the myopic planner’s problem can then be written as follows:15
V
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z,K,E,{nk, ¯ nk, ¯ vk}
M+1
k=1 , ˆ K, ˆ E,
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z,K,E,{nk, ¯ nk, ¯ vk}
M+1
k=1 , ˆ K, ˆ E,
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b nk,b ¯ nk,b ¯ vk
ªM+1



























k = nk−1,f o rk =1 ,...,M +1 (49)
¯ n0
k =¯ nk−1,f o rk =1 ,...,M +1 (50)
¯ v0
k =¯ vk−1,f o rk =1 ,...,M +1 (51)
13Since capital is freely movable, the myopic social planner allocates the aggregate stock of capital K to equate the marginal producitivity of
capital across all types of islands (s,l.j), subject to the feasibility constraint (23).
14The variables X and e X can be removed from the state vector because they are actually redundant (see equation 7).
15O b s e r v et h a te q u a t i o n( 2 4 )m u s tb eu s e dt or e m o v es o m ev a c a n c yt h r e s h o l d¯ v (e.g. ¯ v (smin)) from the formulation of the problem, since
it always hold with equality. Similarly, when the deterministic steady state is such that equation (26) holds with equality, it must be used to
remove some lower employment thresshold n (e.g. n(smin)) from the formulation of the problem. Otherwise, equation (26) must be ignored.
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The condition for a RCE in Proposition 3 then becomes:
ˆ L
³






z,K,E,{nk, ¯ nk, ¯ vk}
M+1





Observe that there are a ﬁnite number of arguments to the return function in equation (48) and that all their values are
strictly positive at the deterministic steady state (except for the aggregate productivity level z). Since R is diﬀerentiable,
a Taylor expansion at the deterministic steady state can then be performed to obtain a quadratic objective function. Since
the constraints in equations (49)-(51) are linear, this delivers a standard linear-quadratic RCE structure that can be solved
using standard methods (e.g. Hansen and Prescott (14)).16 The linear decision rule D thus obtained is a good local
approximation and, as long as ﬂuctuations in the aggregate productivity shock z are small, it can be used to simulate and
analyze equilibrium business cycle ﬂuctuations.
5 Calibration
Throughout the rest of the paper the recruitment technology will be given a matching function interpretation in which
employment and recruitment opportunities are produced in pairs at the aggregate level. In particular, the recruitment
technology will be restricted to satisfy that
G(A,U,A,U)=H(A,U,A,U), (54)
for every (A,U).
Two version of the model economy are considered: One where the matching technology is subject to congestion exter-




















16Strictly speaking, the linear-quadratic structure is obtained only when the aggregate law of motion ˆ L in equation (52) is linear. However,
this will be true in equilibrium. In fact, Hansen and Prescott (14) update the linear law of motion ˆ L at each value function iteration by imposing
the RCE condition (53) on the linear decision rule D obtained from the iteration.
15Both matching technologies satisfy equation (54) and all the assumptions made in Section 2. Moreover, they both







Also, observe that the matching technology with congestion externalities given by equations (55) and (56) captures a
standard assumption in the matching literature: That the aggregate market-tightness ratio A/U determines the rate at
which individual unemployed workers ﬁnd employment opportunities and the rate at which individual help-wanted ads ﬁnd
recruitment opportunities.
The rest of this section calibrates the steady states of both versions of the model economy to identical long-run U.S.
observations. Before proceeding it will be necessary to select a model time-period that is both convenient and consistent
with observations.
The Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is an important
source of information for two key features of the model: the creation of recruitment opportunities (i.e. job openings) and
the worker turnover process. JOLTS, which is a monthly survey of continuing nonagricultural establishments, deﬁnes job
openings as positions for which there is work available, for which a job could start within 30 days, and for which there is
an active recruitment eﬀort taking place (such as advertisement in newspapers, radio and television, posting “help wanted
signs”, interviewing candidates, etc.). Job openings are measured on the last business day of the month. On the contrary,
hirings, which are deﬁned as all additions to the establishments’ payrolls, are measured over the entire month. The vacancy
yield rate deﬁned as the average monthly ratio of hirings to job openings over the entire period 2000-2005 is equal to 1.3
(see Davis et. al, (7)).
Since hirings cannot exceed recruitment opportunities in the model economy (see equation 3), a vacancy yield rate
greater than one can only be obtained through time aggregation. This suggests calibrating to a short time period. However,
computational convenience requires making the time period as large as possible. The largest time period consistent with the
above observation is 3 weeks. The reason is simple: if total hirings turned out to be approximately equal to total recruitment
opportunities, a monthly vacancy yield rate close to 1.3 would be obtained from the simple fact that a month contains 4/3
three-weeks periods. Observe that, since equation (54) implies that recruitment opportunities are equal to E, equation (26)
indicates that a small πu is a necessary condition for total hirings to be close to total recruitment opportunities. In what
follows the time period will thus be tentatively selected to be 3 weeks and πu will be set to zero.17 Moreover, it will be
assumed that total hirings are approximately equal to total recruitment opportunities. Later on it will be veriﬁed that this
assumption is correct and that the monthly vacancy yield rate ob t a i n e di si n d e e dc o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h eJ O L T Sm e a s u r e m e n t .
The next issue that must be addressed is what actual measure of capital should the model capital correspond to. Since
the focus is on establishment level dynamics, it seems natural to abstract from capital components such as land, residential
structures, and consumer durables. The empirical counterpart for capital is then identiﬁed with plant, equipment, and
17Observe that, since establishments invest in recruitment opportunities one period in advance and some of them end-up transiting to lower
idiosyncratic productivity levels (or even exiting), not all existing recruitment opportunities end-up being exercised. Thus, when πu is equal to
zero equation (26) holds with strict inequality. This in turn implies that pe must be equal to pu, since owners of employable workers must be
made indiﬀerent between selling them or keeping them as unemployed workers.
16inventories. As a result, investment is associated in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) with nonresidential
investment plus changes in business inventories. The empirical counterpart for consumption is identiﬁed with personal
consumption expenditures in nondurable goods and services. Output is then deﬁned as the sum of these investment and
consumption measures. The quarterly capital-output ratio and the investment-output ratio corresponding to these measures
are 6.8 and 0.15, respectively. Since at steady state I/Y = δ(K/Y ), these ratios require that δ =0 .005515.
The production function is assumed to have the following functional form:
y = snγkθ,
where 0 <γ+θ<1. Calibrating to an annual interest rate of 4 percent, which is a standard value in the macro literature,






matching the U.S. capital-output ratio requires choosing a value of θ equal to 0.2168. Similarly, γ =0 .64 is selected to
reproduce the share of labor in National Income.18 Observe that, since workers are capital goods, the “wage rate” used in
calculating the labor share is given by the user cost (1 − β)pe. In what follows, the value of pe will be normalized to an
arbitrary value and the utility of leisure parameter ϕ will be selected to generate that value.
The values for the idiosyncratic productivity levels s, the distribution over initial productivity levels ψ and the transition
matrix Q are key determinants of the job-ﬂows generated by the model. As a consequence I choose them to reproduce
observations from the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) data set, which is a virtual census of establishments level
dynamics. Since BED data across establishment sizes can be found for the nine employment ranges shown in the ﬁrst
column of Table 1, I restrict the idiosyncratic productivity levels s to take nine positive values (s1,s 2,...,s9,w i t hsi <s j
for every i<j ) and choose them so that all establishments with a same idiosyncratic productivity level choose employment
levels in the same range.
The average size of new entrants can be obtained by dividing the total gross job gains at opening establishments by
the total number of opening establishments. Using data between 1992:Q3 and 2005:Q4, I ﬁnd that the average size of new
entrants is equal to 5.3 employees. Since this is a small number, I restrict the distribution over initial productivity levels ψ
to put positive mass on only the two lowest values of s and choose ψ(s1) to reproduce that average size.
Similarly, the average size at exit can be obtained by dividing the total gross job losses at closing establishments by the
total number of closing establishments. Using data for the same time period as above, I ﬁnd that the average size at exit
is equal to 5.2 employees. Since this is also a small number, I restrict the probabilities of transiting to a zero productivity
level Q(s,0) to take positive values only at the three lowest values of s. The values for Q(s1,0), Q(s2,0) and Q(s3,0) are
then chosen to reproduce three observations: 1) the average size at exit, 2) the average quarterly rate of gross job losses due
to closing establishments (JLD), which is equal to 1.6%, and 3) the average quarterly exit rate of establishments, which is
18In the model, γ is not strictly the same as the share of labor in National Income. However, under γ =0 .64 the labor share turns out to be
0.6367.
17equal to 5.2%.19
The rest of the transition matrix Q is parameterized with enough ﬂexibility to reproduce other important establishment
level observations. The only restriction that I impose is that Q(si,s j) > 0 only if j = i − 1, j = i or j = i +1 .S i n c et h e
rows of Q add to one this introduces 16 parameters (2 parameters each, for i =2 ,...,8, and 1 parameter each, for i =1 ,9).
Eight of these parameters are chosen to reproduce the shares in total employment across size classes (which provide eight
independent observations). The other eight parameters are chosen to reproduce the shares in total gross job gains across
size classes (which also provide eight independent observations). I must point out that the BED does not tabulate statistics
across size classes in its regular reports. However, these statistics can be found in Okolie (19) (Tables 1 and 3) for the ﬁrst
two quarters of 2000. These statistics together with the corresponding model statistics are shown in the ﬁrst panel of Table
1. The second panel reports the average sizes at entry and exit both in the model and the data. We see that the model
does a good job at reproducing these observations. As a test of the model, Table 1 also includes the shares in total gross
job losses across size classes for the ﬁrst two quarters of 2000 in Okolie (19), and the average quarterly rates of gross job
gains due to expanding establishments (JGE), gross job gains due to opening establishments (JGB), and gross job losses
due to contracting establishments (JLC) reported by the BED for the period 1992:Q3-2005:Q4. Although the ﬁti sn o t
perfect, we see that the model also does a good job at reproducing these addional statistics.
The exogenous separation rate πn and the number of establishments created every period   are important determinants
of the worker ﬂows in and out of unemployment, so I calibrate them to reproduce this type of observations. In particular,
I target an average monthly separation rate from employment equal to 3.5% and an average monthly hazard rate from
unemployment equal to 46%, which were estimated by Shimer (21) using CPS data between 1948 and 2004. Since the
separation rate of 3.5% is signiﬁcantly larger than the rate of job losses experienced by establishments, I select a positive
value of πn to reproduce the excess worker reallocation.20 Also, observe that the separation and hazard rates estimated
by Shimer (21) imply a steady state unemployment rate equal to 7.1%. The average size of establishments implied by the
distribution reported in Table 1 thus determine the entry rate of establishments   that is needed to generate an aggregate
employment level N equal to 0.929.
B a s e do ne v i d e n c ei nB a r r o ne t . a l( 5 )a n dS i l v aa n dT o l e do (22), Hagedorn and Manovskii (9) determined that the
costs of hiring a worker are equivalent to 4.5% of quarterly wages.21 Since total hirings are assumed to be approximately
equal to total recruitment opportunities, the cost of hiring a worker is approximately equal to the price of a next-period
recruitment opportunity pv. This suggest calibrating parameter values to reproduce the following relation:
pv =0 .045 × 4 × (1 − β)pe, (59)
where (1 − β)pe represents 3-weeks wages and a factor of 4 is needed to convert them into quarterly wages. Recall that the
price of a worker pe was normalized to an arbitrary value. Thus, equation (59) solely imposes a restriction on pv.
19Since the model time period is three weeks, quarterly statistics are constructed following establishments over four consecutive time periods.
20Not surprisingly, my calibrated value of πn is smaller than the quit rate of workers measured by JOLTS (equal to 2% a month), since many
of those separations entail job-to-job transitions that the model abstracts from.
21Since in their model capital is iddle while a job is open, Hagedorn and. Manovskii (9) add an imputed opportunity cost of capital to the
total costs of hiring a worker. I do not make such adjustment because there is no iddle capital in my model.
18The steady-state price of a recruitment opportunity pv depends on A , U and the matching function curvature parameter










which must be equal to the hazard rate of unemployment that we are calibrating to (i.e. the monthly hazard rate of 46%,
estimated by Shimer (21)). Since we are calibrating to a known value of U (equal to 0.071), equations (59) and (60) can be
used to solve for A and φ. The values thus obtained are quite reasonable. In particular, the implied elasticity of the hazard
rate from unemployment G(A,U,A,U)/U to the unemployment-help-wanted-ads ratio U/A turn out to be 0.52 in the case
of congestion externalities and 0.64 i nt h ec a s eo fe ﬃcient matching. This elasticities are within the range estimated by
previous studies (e.g. Shimer (20), Hall (13), etc.).
As a test of the model Table 2 reports a set of basic monthly statistics both for JOLTS and the model economy that
were not used as calibration targets (except for the vacancy yield rate).23. We see that the model does a reasonable job at
reproducing not only the vacancy yield rate, but the hiring and separation rates for continuing establishments, the fraction
of vacancies with zero hirings and the fraction of hires with zero vacancies. The low rate of exogenous separations πn
explains the model’s success in reproducing the fraction of vacancies with zero hirings. The reason is that a signiﬁcant
number of establishments reach the lower thresholds n and start hiring just enough workers to replenish the exogenous
separation of workers. Since the monthly rate of exogenous separation is less than 1%, following Davis et al. (7), I classify
these establishments (and their corresponding vacancies) as having zero hirings.
Observe that the model’s ability at reproducing the JOLTS vacancy yield rate conﬁrms that the strategy of calibrating
to a three weeks time-period and setting πu to zero was justiﬁed. In fact, the assumption that total hirings are approxi-
mately equal to total recruitment opportunities is veriﬁed: Total hirings turn out to be 96% as large as total recruitment
opportunities.
Finally, the parameters ρz and σ2
ε governing the aggregate productivity shock process are selected to reproduce the
empirical behavior of measured Solow residuals in the U.S. economy.24 Deﬁning output and capital as above and using
civilian employment as the labor input, I ﬁnd that measured Solow residuals are highly persistent and that their quarterly
proportionate changes have a standard deviations equal to 0.0064 over the period 1951:1-2004:4.25 It turns out that values
of ρz =0 .95 and σε =0 .0041 are needed to reproduce these observations using the artiﬁcial data generated by both versions
of the model economy.26
All calibrated parameter values are summarized in Table 3.
22For the details, see Section 4.1 in the Technical Appendix.
23JOLTS statistics are from Davis et al. (7).
24Let γe denote the empirical labor share implicit in the National Income and Product Accounts. Proportionate changes in measured Solow
residuals are then deﬁned as the proportionate change in aggregate output minus the sum of the proportionate change in labor times γe,m i n u s
the sum of the proportionate change in capital times (1 − γe).
25Solow residuals are constructed using an empirical labor share γe equal to 0.64.
26In both model economies quarterly Solow residuals are measured with the same empirical labor share γe used to measure Solow residuals in
196B u s i n e s s c y c l e s
This section uses both versions of the model economy calibrated in the previous section to address three important questions:
1) Can the neoclassical theory developed so far account for U.S. business cycle observations?, 2) Which scenario for the
matching process is empirically more plausible: The eﬃcient matching or the congestion externalities scenarios?, and 3) Is
the model consistent with microeconomic adjustments at the establishment level?
Before turning to these questions it will be useful to describe salient features of U.S. business cycle ﬂuctuations. Table
4 reports business cycle statistics for a number of U.S. time series corresponding to the period 1951:1 to 2004:4. All time
series were logged and detrended using the Hoddrick-Prescott ﬁlter with smoothing parameter 1,600 before computing any
statistics.
The upper panel of Table 4 reports standard deviations and correlations with output for GDP (Y ), consumption (C),
investment (I), capital (K), civilian employment (N), and labor productivity (Y/N). These statistics are standard in
the RBC literature. They show that consumption, employment and labor productivity ﬂuctuate roughly 61% as much as
output, that capital ﬂuctuates only 43% as much as output, that investment ﬂuctuates 3.3 times more than output, and
that all variables are strongly procyclical except for capital, which is acyclical.
The lower panel of Table 4 reports standard deviations and the cross-correlation matrix for GDP (Y ), employment
(N), unemployment (U), help-wanted ads (A), market tightness (A/U), job ﬁnding probability (H/U), employment exit
probability (F/N), job creation rate (JC) and job destruction rate (JD). The job ﬁnding and employment exit probabilities,
H/U and F/N, are from Shimer (21). The job creation and job destruction rates, JC and JD, are from Davis, Faberman
and Haltiwanger (7) (based on BED data) and correspond to the subperiod 1990:2-2004:4.27 The statistics in the lower
panel of Table 4 have been emphasized in the labor literature (e.g. Hagedorn and Manovskii (9), Shimer (20), Davis and
Haltiwanger, etc.). They show that unemployment and help wanted ads ﬂuctuate about 7.3 times more than output, that
the employment exit probability ﬂuctuates 2.5 times more than output and that the job ﬁnding probability is about 40%
more variable than the employment exit probability, and that the job creation rate ﬂuctuates 1.4 times more than output and
that job destruction rate is about 65% more variable than the job creation rate. Unemployment is strongly countercyclical,
help wanted ads and the job ﬁnding rate are strongly procyclical, the employment exit probability is countercyclical, and
the job creation and job destruction rates show weak cyclical patterns. Also observe that a “Beveridge curve” is obtained:
help-wanted ads and unemployment are strongly negatively correlated (their correlation is -0.92).
6.1 Eﬃcient matching vs. congestion externalities
Table 5 reports business cycle statistics for the model economy with eﬃcient matching. Time series of length equal to 864
time periods were computed for 100 simulations and then aggregated into a quarterly frequency to obtain 216 quarters of
the U.S. economy.
27Job creation (JC) corresponds to the sum of gross job gains due to expanding establishments (JGE) and gross job gains due to opening
establishments (JGB). Job destruction (JD) corresponds to the sum of gross job losses due to contracting establishments (JLC) and job losses
due to closing establishments (JLD).
20data (the same length as the U.S. series). The reported statistics are averages across these simulations. With regard to
standard RBC statistics, we see from the upper-panels of Tables 4 and 5 that the model with eﬃcient matching reproduces
the comovements with output quite well: Except for capital, which is acyclical, all other variables are procyclical. The
model’s performance is not as good in terms of standard deviations, though. We see that investment ﬂuctuations are as
large as in the data but the rest of the variables are much smoother. The largest diﬀerence is with consumption, which
ﬂuctuates only 29% as much as in the data. However, this is a standard problem with RBC models. The most disappointing
performance is with employment, which ﬂuctuates only 37% as much as in the data. This smoothness is in turn inherited
by output, which ﬂuctuates only 69% as much as in the U.S. The failure of the model with eﬃcient matching to account
for labor market dynamics is evident in the lower panel. We see that unemployment, help-wanted ads, the job ﬁnding and
employment exit probabilities and the job creation and job destruction rates ﬂuctuate too little compared with the data.
Moreover, the model fails to generate a strong “Beveridge curve”: the correlation of unemployment with help-wanted ads
is only -0.61.
We now turn to the model with congestion externalities in the matching process. Table 6 shows the results. We
see that in terms of standard RBC statistics that this version of the model replicates U.S. business cycle observations
at least as well as the economy with eﬃcient matching. Comovements with output are still very similar with the data:
consumption, investment, employment and labor productivity are all procyclical while capital is acyclical. The dimension in
which the economy with congestion externalities outperforms the economy with eﬃcient matching is in standard deviations:
Employment, capital and output go from being 37%, 62% and 69% as volatile as the data to being 93%, 82%, 91% as volatile,
respectively.28 The model with congestion externalities also outperforms the model with eﬃcient matching in terms of labor
market statistics. In the lower panel of Table 6 we see that unemployment, help-wanted ads, the job-ﬁnding probability,
the employment-exit probability, the job creation rate and the job destruction rate become much more variable than in the
model with eﬃcient matching. Also the economy now generates a more noticeable Beveridge curve: The correlation between
unemployment and help-wanted ads is -0.76. Although these are improvements over the model with eﬃcient matching, the
empirical performance of the model is far from perfect: 1) help-wanted ads ﬂuctuate 45% more than in the data, 2) the
job-ﬁnding probability is 9 times more volatile than the employment-exit probability, while in the data they are only 40%
more volatile, and 3) job destruction is as variable as job creation, while in the data job destruction is 65% more variable.
Before turning to these limitations the rest of this section explores the reasons for the improved performance of the model
with matching externalities.
Observe that there are two diﬀerences between the economy with eﬃcient matching and the economy with congestion
externalities. First, as Table 3 indicates, the economies have diﬀerent parameter values (in particular, the curvature of the
matching function φ and the utility of leisure ϕ are diﬀerent). Second, although their aggregate matching functions have
identical functional forms (see equation 58), their individual matching technologies are diﬀerent (compare equations 55-
56 with equation 57). In order to determine which of these diﬀerences drives the result that the economy with congestion
externalities outperforms the economy with eﬃcient matching, Table 7 reports the business cycle statistics for the Pareto
optimal allocation of the economy with congestion externalities. Since the social planner fully internalizes the eﬀects of the
28The only drawback is with labor productivity, which goes from being 76% as volatile as the data to being only 58% as volatile.
21congestion externalities, any diﬀerences between these statistics and those of the economy with eﬃcient matching reported
in Table 5 can be solely attributed to diﬀerences in parameter values. Since Table 7 is very similar to Table 5, we conclude
that the bulk of the diﬀerences in business cycle ﬂuctuations between the economy with eﬃcient matching and the economy
with congestion externalities is not due to diﬀerent parameter values but to the diﬀerent individual matching technologies.29
In order to determine what feature of the matching technology with congestion externalities is essential for generating



















where A∗ and U∗ are positive parameters. Observe that if an economy had identical parameter values as the economy with
congestion externalities but its matching technology was described by equations (61) and (62), with A∗ and U∗ given by
the steady-state values of help-wanted ads and unemployment in the economy with congestion externalities, respectively,
its steady state would be identical to the steady state of the economy with congestion externalities. However, its business
cycles would be diﬀerent. The reason is that the linear matching technology in equations (61) and (62) has a constant
productivity while the linear matching technology faced by the myopic social planner in the economy with congestion
externalities is subject to “productivity shocks” given by the realizations of the market tightness ratio A/U.T a b l e 8
reports the business cycle statistics for this economy. We see that its business cycles are in fact much larger than in the
economy with congestion externalities: Except for labor productivity and help-wanted ads, all variables are signiﬁcantly
more volatile than in Table 6. This indicates that the crucial feature generating the relatively large business cycles in
the economy with congestion externalities is the linearity of the individual matching technology given by equations (55)
and (56): The external eﬀects from endogenous variations in the market tightness ratio A/U only serve to dampen the
aggregate ﬂuctuations generated by the economy. This is not surprising. Since equation (26) holds with strict inequality,
the technology for creating workers with employment opportunities in equation (55) is largely irrelevant for business cycles.
On the contrary, the technology for creating recruitment opportunities in equation (56) binds the amount of hiring that the
economy can undertake. Since aggregate market tightness A/U is strongly procyclical in Table 6, the productivity of the
technology for creating recruitment opportunities turns out to be countercyclical. This reduces the response of aggregate
employment to aggregate productivity shocks, leading to lower employment ﬂuctuations in Table 6 than in Table 8. This
also explains why help-wanted ads are more volatile in Table 6 than in Table 8: Help-wanted ads need to respond more to
aggregate productivity shocks to partially compensate for the countercyclical productivity of the technology for creating
recrutiment opportunities.
29From Tables 6 and 7 we also conclude that introducing policies that achieve the ﬁrst-best allocation would signiﬁcantly reduce aggregate
ﬂuctuations in the economy with congestion externalities. See the working paper version (Veracierto xx) for an analysis of such policies.
226.2 Reallocation shocks
Section 6.1 showed that the economy with congestion externalities generates much more realistic business cycle ﬂuctuations
than the economy with eﬃcient matching. However, it had several limitations: 1) help-wanted ads ﬂuctuated much more
than in the data, 2) the job-ﬁnding probability was several times more volatile than the employment-exit probability (while
in the data it is only slightly more volatile), and 3) the job destruction rate was as variable as the job creation rate (while
in the data it is considerably more volatile).
The purpose of this section is to explore to what extent the model’s performance could be improved by introducing
reallocation shocks that aﬀect the idiosyncratic productivity process. This is a natural starting point since reallocation
shocks directly inﬂuence the behavior of job creation and job destruction. Since the job creation and destruction process
have strong implications for help-wanted ads, the job-ﬁnding probability and the employment-exit probability, reallocation
shocks have the potential of aﬀecting the behavior of these other variables as well. In what follows, reallocation shocks will
be introduced to make volatility of job destruction (relative to the volatility of job creation) as large as in the data. A key
question will be if these reallocation shocks help improve the model’s performance in other dimensions.
A wide variety of reallocation shocks may be analyzed using the computational approach developed in this paper. For
instance, the reallocation shock considered could aﬀect the dispersion of the idiosyncratic productivity levels s while leaving
the transition matrix Q unchanged. Another possible reallocation shock could leave the idiosyncratic productivity levels s
unchanged while aﬀecting the persistence Q(s,s) of the diﬀerent idiosyncratic productivity levels s. It turns out that these
types of reallocations shocks do not improve the model’s performance. The reason is that they synchronize the ﬂuctuations
in job creation and job destruction and thus fail to generate their asymmetric volatilities.
In order to break this synchronization the following reallocation shock will be considered. Let S∗ be the set of idiosyn-
cratic productivity levels and Q∗ the transition matrix that were calibrated in Section 5. The reallocation shock rt analyzed
leaves the set of values for the idiosyncratic productivity levels unchanged at S∗ but aﬀects the transitions matrix Qt as
follows. For every s and s0 in S∗,
Qt(s,s0)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
Q∗ (s,s0),i fs0 >s ,
ertQ∗ (s,s0),i fs0 <s ,
1 −
P
s00<s ertQ∗ (s,s00) −
P
s00>s Q∗ (s,s00),i fs0 = s.
(63)
Observe that this reallocation shock rt aﬀects the probabilities of transiting to lower productivity levels but not the
probabilities of transiting to higher productivity levels. Any variations in the probabilities of transiting to lower productivity
levels are absorbed by the probabilities of no-change.30






























t+1 are normally distributed with zero mean and unit standard deviation.
30Restrictions to ensure that the probabilities of no-change Q(s,s) remain positive for every possible realization of the reallocation shock rt
are ignored in equation (63) since these restrictions turn out to be non-binding in the experiments.
23Allowing the reallocation shock rt to be negatively correlated with the aggregate productivity shock zt is crucial for
g e n e r a t i n ga s y m m e t r i e si nt h ej o bc r e a t i o na n dj o bd e s t r u c tion process. To see this, suppose that the economy is hit
by a negative aggregate productivity shock that is accompanied by higher transition probabilities to lower idiosyncratic
productivity levels. Since these higher transition probabilities generate job destruction, the response of job destruction
to the negative aggregate productivity shock will thus be ampliﬁed. In addition, if the larger transition probabilities are
short-lived (i.e. if ρrr is close to zero), the response of job creation to the negative aggregate productivity shock will be
dampened. The reason, is that after its initial fall, the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity levels will be reverting
towards the invariant distribution generated by the transition matrix Q∗, creating job creation over time. Both eﬀects work
in the same direction: making job destruction relatively more volatile than job creation.31
Given the above discussion, the reallocation shocks will be restricted to be short-lived and perfectly negatively correlated
with innovations in aggregate productivity. In turn, the aggregate productivity shock will be allowed to have the same




























The parameters σzz and σrz in equation (65) are selected to reproduce two important observations. First, that the
standard deviation of measured Solow residuals is equal to 0.0064 (the same observation that was used in the benchmark
case). Second, that the standard deviation of job destruction is 65% larger than the standard deviation of job creation.
The parameter values consistent with these observations turn out to be σzz =0 .00385 and σrz = −0.07.
Table 9 reports the business cycle statistics for this economy. We see that in terms of standard RBC statistics, that the
economy with reallocation shocks is virtually identical to the benchmark economy with congestion externalities (see the
upper pannel of Table 6). In fact, despite of the fact that the aggregate productivity shock is 6% less variable and that the
reallocation shock is i.i.d., the economy with reallocation shocks is slightly more volatile than than the benchmark case.
There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in terms of labor market statistics, though. The most obvious is that (by construction)
job destruction is now much more volatile than job creation, bringing the job creation and destruction process closer to
the data. There are signiﬁcant improvements on other variables as well. In particular, the volatility of help-wanted ads A
and market tightness A/U a r em o r ei nl i n ew i t ht h ed a t aa n dac l e a r e rB e v eridge curve is now obtained (the correlation
between unemployment and help wanted ads is -0.81). We see that the reallocation shocks also help reduce the volatility of
the job-ﬁnding probability relative to the volatility of the employment-exit probability: the job-ﬁnding probability is now
3 times more variable than the employment-exit probability, while it was 9 times larger in the benchmark case. However,
this asymmetry is still too large compared to the data. The reason why it is so hard for the model economy to generate
large ﬂuctuations in the employment-exit probability is that a large component of it is constant over the cycle: It is given
by the exogenous quit rate of workers πn. Endogenizing this margin may improve the performance of the model in this
31The assymmetric volatilities may not be obtained if ρrr is close to one. If after a negative aggregate productivity shock hits the economy
establishments expect good idiosyncratic productivity levels to be much more transient than before, they will have fewer incentives to invest in
recruitment opportunities after a high idiosyncratic productivity level is realized. As a consequence, the drop in job creation after the negative
aggregate productivity shock hits the economy may actually be ampliﬁed.
24particular dimension.
We have seen that the reallocation shock introduced improve the empirical performance of the model in terms of its job
creation and destruction rates, job-ﬁnding and employment-exit probabilities, and help wanted ads. While there is ample
evidence that idiosyncratic uncertainty increases during recessions (e.g. Bloom, 2009; Gilchrist et al, 2009; Bachmann and
Bayer, 2009), it would be desirable to determine the precise empirical nature of reallocation shocks before jumping to any
strong conclusions. The results presented in this section indicates that this may be a fruitful area of research. Having said
this, the reallocation shocks introduced had very minor eﬀects on macroeconomic variables such as output, employment,
consumption and investment. Thus, reproducing the cyclical microeconomic adjustments observed in the data may turn
up unimportant for aggregate business cycle dynamics.
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27Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 4: From equations (38) and (39) we know that an establishment of type (s,l,j) transits to a
next-period type (s0,l 0,j0),w i t hs0 randomly determined,
l0 = n∗(s,l,j), (66)
and





Since establishments are created with (l,j)=( 0 ,0), P(0) describes the set of all possible types (s,l,j) of establishments of
zero age.
Deﬁne
N (0) = {0}.
Since n∗(s,l,j)=0whenever (l,j)=( 0 ,0), N(0) describes the set of all possible employment levels of establishments of
zero age.
Starting from N(0),d e ﬁne recursively a sequence of sets P(m) and N (m) as follows:
P(m) =
½
(s,l,j): s ∈ S, l ∈ N(m−1),a n dj ∈∪
s−1∈S










n: n =( 1− πn)nm−1 for some nm−1 ∈ N(m−1)
o
,
for m =1 ,2,...,∞.
From equations (38), (39), (66) and (67) we know that P(m) contains the set of all possible types (s,l,j) of establishments
of age m,a n dt h a tN (m) contains the set of all possible employment levels of establishments of age m.32










k n∗ (s),(1 − πn)
k ¯ n∗ (s),(1 − πn)
k ¯ v∗ (s)
o¾
∪ {0}, (68)
for m =1 ,2,...,∞.
A direct consequence of equation (68) is that N (m−1) ⊂ N (m),f o re v e r ym ≥ 1.T h u s ,t h es e tN (m) in fact contains
all the possible employment levels of establishments of age m or younger and the set P(m) ∪ P(0) contains all the possible
types of establishments of age m or younger. Moreover,




m−1 n∗ (s),(1 − πn)
m−1 ¯ n∗ (s),(1 − πn)
m−1 ¯ v∗ (s)
o
, (69)
32Observe that the “max” and “min” operators in equation (38) have been disregarded in the construction of the sets P(m) and N(m).T h u s ,
the set of actual types of establishments of age m and the set of actual employment levels of establishments of age m are smaller than P(m) and
N(m), respectively.
28for m =1 ,2,...,∞,w h e r e“ /” denotes set diﬀerence.
In what follows it will be shown that there exists a M<∞ such that N(M) contains the set of all possible employment
levels of establishments of all ages m =0 ,1,...,∞.T op r o v et h i si ts u ﬃces to show that there exists a M<∞ such that no
establishment of age M +1will choose an employment level in the set N (M+1)/N (M), i.e. all establishments of age M +1
will choose an employment level in the set N(M).33
Let M satisfy equation (40). Since 0 <π n < 1,s u c haM exists.
Let (s,l,j) ∈ P(M+1).
Suppose that n∗(s,l,j) ∈ N (M+1)/N (M).S i n c eN (M+1)/N(M) satisﬁes equation (69), and M satisﬁes equation (40), it
follows that
n∗(s,l,j) ≤ (1 − πn)
M max{¯ n∗ (smax), ¯ v∗ (smax)} < min{n∗ (smin), ¯ v∗ (smin)}. (70)
Also, since n∗(s,l,j) satisﬁes equation (38) and (s,l,j) ∈ P(M+1),w eh a v et h a t







From equation (71) and the last inequality in equation (70), we then have that
n∗(s,l,j)=( 1− πn)l.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that j =0 .
Suppose that some establishment of age M transits to (s,l,j). From equation (67), this can be the case only if
0=m a x{¯ v∗ (s−1) − (1 − πn)l,0},
for some s−1 ∈ S.
But, from equation (70)
n∗(s,l,j)=( 1− πn)l<¯ v∗ (s−1),
for all s−1 ∈ S. A contradiction.
Hence, (s,l,j) ∈ P(M+1) does not correspond to an establishment of age M +1 .
Suppose now that j>0.
Let s−1 be such that (1 − πn)l + j =¯ v∗ (s−1) (since (s,l,j) ∈ P(M+1),s u c ha ns−1 exists).





min{¯ v∗ (s−1),n ∗(s)},






n∗(s,l,j)=( 1− πn)l ≤ ¯ n∗(s) and n∗(s,l,j)=( 1− πn)l ≥ min{¯ v∗ (s−1),n ∗(s)}. (72)
33This condition is suﬃcient because whenever an establishment reaches age M +1 , its age can be reset to M without consequence. This
procedure can be repeated an inﬁnite number of times.
29The second inequality in equation (72) contradicts equation (70).
We conclude that no establishment of age M +1chooses an employment level in the set N (M+1)/N (M). It follows that
the set P∗ = P(M+1) ∪ P(0) is a support of the invariant distribution μ∗.¥





min{(1 − πn}l + j,nt−k (s),






vt−k(s,l,j)=m a x{¯ vt−k (s) − (1 − πn)nt−k(s,l,j),0}, (74)
for k =0 ,1,...,M +1 .
a) We will ﬁrst show that Pt+1 is a support of the distribution μt+1.





M−1 nt−M (s),(1 − πn)
M−1 ¯ nt−M (s),(1 − πn)
M−1 ¯ vt−M−1 (s)
o
,
Bt+1 = {l0 : l0 =( 1− πn)l, for some l ∈ Nt/At}. (75)
Observe that




{nt (s), ¯ nt (s), ¯ vt−1 (s)}
¾
. (76)
To show that Pt+1 is a support of the distribution μt+1 it suﬃces to show that
(s,l,j) ∈ Pt =⇒ nt (s,l,j) ∈ Nt+1 and vt (s,l,j) ∈∪
s0∈S
{max[¯ vt (s0) − (1 − πn)nt (s,l,j),0]}. (77)
Let (s,l,j) ∈ Pt.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that (l,j)=( 0 ,0).
From equation (73) we then have that nt(s,l,j)=0and, from equation (74), that vt(s,l,j)=¯ vt (s). Therefore, equation
(77) is satisﬁed.
Suppose, now, that (l,j) 6=( 0 ,0).
Then,
s ∈ S, l ∈ Nt and j ∈∪
s0∈S
{max[¯ vt−1 (s0) − (1 − πn)l,0]}. (78)





min{max[¯ vt−1 (s0),(1 − πn)l],n t (s)},





for some s0 ∈ S.
As a consequence,







30From equations (75), (76) and (80) we have that
l ∈ Nt/At ⇒ nt(s,l,j) ∈ Nt+1.
Suppose that l ∈ At. Without loss of generality assume that
l =( 1− πn)
M−1 nt−M (b s)
for some b s ∈ S (the cases l =( 1− πn)
M−1 ¯ nt−M (b s) and l =( 1− πn)
M−1 ¯ vt−M−1 (b s) can be handled in exactly the same
way).
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for some s0 ∈ S.
But from equation (40) and equations (42)-(44), we have that
(1 − πn)
M nt−M (b s) < (1 − πn)
M ¯ nt−M (b s) ≤ (1 − πn)
M ¯ nt−M (smax) < ¯ vt−1 (smin) ≤ ¯ vt−1 (s0),
and that
(1 − πn)
M nt−M (b s) < (1 − πn)
M ¯ nt−M (b s) ≤ (1 − πn)
M ¯ nt−M (smax) <n t (smin) ≤ nt (s) < ¯ nt (s).





min{¯ vt−1 (s0),n t (s)},
(1 − πn)




=m i n {¯ vt−1 (s0),n t (s)}.
Thus, from equations (76), nt(s,l,j) ∈ Nt+1.
From equation (74), observe that




{max[¯ vt (s0) − (1 − πn)nt (s,l,j),0]}.
Therefore, Pt+1 is a support of the distribution μt+1.
b) To prove the second part of the Proposition it will be convenient to deﬁne the following (one-to-one and onto)
functions.





31where (s,l∗,j∗) i st h eu n i q u ee l e m e n to fP∗ satisfying that |l − l∗| <ε / 2 and |[(1 − πn)l + j] − [(1 − πn)l∗ + j∗]| <ε / 2.





where (s0,l ∗,j∗) is the unique element of P∗ satisfying that |l0 − l∗| <ε / 2 and |[(1 − πn)l0 + j0] − [(1 − πn)l∗ + j∗]| <ε / 2.











Let (s0,l 0,j0) ∈ Pt+1.






t (l,j)) +  ψ (s0)I (l0,j0),
where





























To show that equation (83) holds, it then suﬃces to show that






=( 0 ,0), (84)
(s,l,j) ∈ Gt(l0,j0)= ⇒ (s,l∗
t (l,j),j∗






















is the inverse function of (l∗
t,j∗
t ).
b.1) Proof of equation (84).
It is a direct consequence of how l∗
t+1 and j∗
t+1 were deﬁned and equations (42)-(44).
b.2) Proof of equation (85).
Let (s,l,j) ∈ Gt(l0,j0). Then, (s,l,j) ∈ Pt,
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(1 − πn)l0 + j0 =m a x{¯ vt (s),(1 − πn)l0}.
Observe that (s,l∗
t (l,j),j∗
t (l,j)) ∈ P∗,
n∗(s,l∗
t(l,j),j∗
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t (l,j)) + v∗(s,l∗
t(l,j),j∗
t (l,j))




|(1 − πn)l − (1 − πn)l∗
t(l,j)| <ε / 2,
|[(1 − πn)l + j] − [(1 − πn)l∗
t(l,j)+j∗
t (l,j)]| <ε / 2,
|nt (s) − n∗ (s)| <ε / 2,
and








t (l,j)) + v∗(s,l∗
t(l,j),j∗
t (l,j))] − [(1 − πn)l0 + j0]| <ε / 2. (88)















t (l,j)) ∈ P∗ it follows that
(s,l∗
t(l,j),j∗
t (l,j)) ∈ G∗(l∗
t+1(l0,j0),j∗
t+1(l0,j0)).
b.3) Proof of equation (86).
Let (s,l∗,j∗) ∈ G∗(l∗
t+1(l0,j0),j∗







min{(1 − πn)l∗ + j∗,n ∗ (s)}








t+1(l0,j0)=( 1 − πn)n∗ (s,l∗,j∗)+v∗(s,l∗,j∗) (91)
=m a x
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Panel A: BED data, March 2000 to June 2000
Size Data Model
Classes∗ Shares in Shares in Shares in Shares in Shares in Shares in
(employees) Employment Job Gains Job Losses Employment Job Gains Job Losses
[1,5) 6.4% 16.9% 9.7% 6.2% 16.2% 8.6%
[5,10) 8.1% 13.1% 11.6% 9.0% 13.1% 10.7%
[10,20) 10.7% 14.9% 13.7% 12.3% 14.1% 10.8%
[20,50) 16.6% 18.3% 18.2% 16.4% 18.4% 14.7%
[50,100) 13.1% 11.6% 12.6% 12.0% 12.2% 16.2%
[100,250) 16.5% 11.9% 14.6% 16.4% 13.1% 13.9%
[250,500) 9.8% 5.9% 8.5% 9.3% 4.9% 12.4%
[500,1000) 7.3% 3.5% 5.4% 7.1% 8.1% 5.3%
[1000,∞) 11.6% 4.2% 5.9% 11.3% 0.0% 7.5%
Panel B: BED data, 1992:3-2005:4
Data Model
size at entry 5.3 4.4





Exit Rate 5.2% 6.2%Table 2
Monthly observations
Panel A: CPS data, 1948-2004
Data Model
Separation rate 3.5% 3.3%
Hazard rate 46.0% 46.9%
Panel B: JOLTS data, 2000-2005
Data Model
Vacancy rate 2.2% 2.2%
Hiring rate 3.2% 2.9%
Separation rate 3.1% 2.9%
Vacancies yield rate 1.3 1.3
% Vacancies with zero hiring 18.7% 21.9%
% Hiring with zero vacancies 42.3% 39.3%
% Establishments with zero hiring 81.6% 95.8%




  entry of establishments 0.0007038
δ capital depreciation rate 0.0055147
β discount factor 0.9975517
θ capital share 0.216757
γ labor share 0.64
πu quit rate, unemployed workers 0
πn quit rate, employed workers 0.00675
φ curvature, matching function 1.0161441 (eﬃcient matching)
0.734344 (congestion externalities)
ϕ utility of leisure 0.78439 (eﬃcient matching)
0.805099 (congestion externalities)
ρz persistence aggregate shocks 0.95




s0 =0 .00 s1 =6 .3 s2 =6 .7 s3 =7 .7 s4 =8 .6
s5 =9 .4 s6 =1 0 .9 s7 =1 2 .1 s8 =1 3 .1 s9 =1 4 .3
Initial distribution:
ψ0 =0 .00 ψ1 =0 .82 ψ2 =0 .18 ψ3 =0 .00 ψ4 =0 .00
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4Table 4
Business Cycle Statistics: U.S. economy (1951:1-2004:4)
A. Macroeconomic variables
Standard deviations
Y C I K N Y/N
1.58 0.90 6.76 0.68 1.00 0.99
Correlations with output
Y C I K N Y/N
1.00 0.80 0.91 0.05 0.80 0.79
B. Labor market variables
Standard deviations
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC∗ JD∗
1.58 1.00 12.32 13.89 25.66 7.72 5.46 3.70 6.15
Correlations matrix
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC∗ JD∗
Y 1.00 0.80 -0.84 0.90 0.89 0.82 -0.57 0.49 -0.30
N 1.00 -0.87 0.88 0.89 0.87 -0.38 0.21 -0.02
U 1.00 -0.92 -0.98 -0.92 0.54 -0.43 0.03
A 1.00 0.98 0.91 -0.56 0.47 -0.26
A/U 1.00 0.93 -0.56 0.46 -0.16
H/U 1.00 -0.38 0.45 0.06
F/N 1.00 -0.13 0.47
JC∗ 1.00 -0.08
5Table 5
Business Cycle Statistics: Eﬃcient Matching
A. Macroeconomic variables
Standard deviations
Y C I K N Y/N
1.09 0.26 6.23 0.42 0.37 0.75
Correlations with output
Y C I K N Y/N
1.00 0.75 0.99 0.18 0.96 0.99
B. Labor market variables
Standard deviations
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
1.09 0.37 5.20 4.58 8.78 5.52 0.50 1.83 1.97
Correlations matrix
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
Y 1.00 0.96 -0.96 0.76 0.96 0.98 -0.82 0.12 -0.40
N 1.00 -1.00 0.60 0.91 0.97 -0.72 -0.07 -0.22
U 1.00 -0.61 -0.91 -0.97 0.72 0.07 0.23
A 1.00 0.88 0.76 -0.96 0.62 -0.81
A/U 1.00 0.97 -0.93 0.28 -0.56
H/U 1.00 -0.84 0.16 -0.44
F/N 1.00 -0.54 0.76
JC 1.00 -0.70
6Table 6
Business Cycle Statistics: Matching externalities
A. Macroeconomic variables
Standard deviations
Y C I K N Y/N
1.44 0.31 8.26 0.56 0.93 0.58
Correlations with output
Y C I K N Y/N
1.00 0.66 0.99 0.16 0.97 0.93
B. Labor market variables
Standard deviations
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
1.44 0.93 13.68 20.14 31.84 14.57 1.42 4.55 4.77
Correlations matrix
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
Y 1.00 0.97 -0.96 0.79 0.92 0.97 -0.62 0.08 -0.31
N 1.00 -0.99 0.73 0.89 0.97 -0.54 -0.03 -0.20
U 1.00 -0.76 -0.91 -0.98 0.54 0.03 0.20
A 1.00 0.96 0.85 -0.85 0.48 -0.67
A/U 1.00 0.96 -0.77 0.29 -0.51
H/U 1.00 -0.67 0.17 -0.38
F/N 1.00 -0.60 0.84
JC 1.00 -0.72
7Table 7
Business Cycle Statistics: Eﬃcient allocation for economy with matching externalities
A. Macroeconomic variables
Standard deviations
Y C I K N Y/N
1.15 0.28 6.60 0.45 0.48 0.71
Correlations with output
Y C I K N Y/N
1.00 0.75 0.99 0.18 0.95 0.98
B. Labor market variables
Standard deviations
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
1.15 0.48 4.92 5.39 9.07 5.58 0.60 2.21 2.40
Correlations matrix
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
Y 1.00 0.95 -0.95 0.72 0.95 0.97 -0.74 0.16 -0.39
N 1.00 -1.00 0.54 0.86 0.94 -0.60 -0.04 -0.19
U 1.00 -0.54 -0.87 -0.94 0.60 0.04 0.19
A 1.00 0.89 0.77 -0.98 0.69 -0.84
A/U 1.00 0.97 -0.91 0.39 -0.60
H/U 1.00 -0.81 0.28 -0.50
F/N 1.00 -0.66 0.82
JC 1.00 -0.73
8Table 8
Business Cycle Statistics: Eﬃcient allocation for economy with linear matching technology
A. Macroeconomic variables
Standard deviations
Y C I K N Y/N
1.82 0.39 10.92 0.71 1.50 0.43
Correlations with output
Y C I K N Y/N
1.00 0.71 0.98 0.16 0.99 0.80
B. Labor market variables
Standard deviations
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
1.82 1.50 24.80 11.39 30.55 28.34 4.16 9.07 8.37
Correlations matrix
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
Y 1.00 0.99 -0.95 0.34 0.90 0.94 0.03 0.18 -0.06
N 1.00 -0.96 0.31 0.90 0.95 0.04 0.16 -0.04
U 1.00 -0.31 -0.93 -0.98 -0.04 -0.16 0.04
A 1.00 0.63 0.41 -0.39 0.72 -0.63
A/U 1.00 0.95 -0.12 0.40 -0.27
H/U 1.00 0.03 0.28 -0.14
F/N 1.00 -0.58 0.76
JC 1.00 -0.70
9Table 9
Business Cycle Statistics: Reallocation shocks
A. Macroeconomic variables
Standard deviations
Y C I K N Y/N
1.48 0.34 8.42 0.56 0.96 0.57
Correlations with output
Y C I K N Y/N
1.00 0.72 0.99 0.17 0.98 0.94
B. Labor market variables
Standard deviations
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
1.48 0.96 12.78 14.53 25.96 13.19 3.11 3.54 5.80
Correlations matrix
Y N U A A/U H/U F/N JC JD
Y 1.00 0.98 -0.97 0.80 0.93 0.97 -0.40 -0.06 -0.27
N 1.00 -0.99 0.78 0.92 0.98 -0.34 -0.12 -0.20
U 1.00 -0.81 -0.94 -0.99 0.34 0.12 0.20
A 1.00 0.96 0.86 -0.75 0.38 -0.68
A/U 1.00 0.97 -0.59 0.15 -0.48
H/U 1.00 -0.40 0.02 -0.30
F/N 1.00 -0.63 0.93
JC 1.00 -0.74
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The household’s Bellman equation is:





+ ϕm + βE [B (κ0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0) | z]
¾
subject to:
c + i + ru (z,K,E,X,μ)m ≤ rk (z,K,E,X,μ)κ + Π(z,K,E,X,μ), (1)
κ0 =( 1 − δ)κ + i (2)
(K0,E0,X0,μ 0)=L(z,K,E,X,μ). (3)
Let λ(κ,z,K,E,X,μ) be the Lagrange multiplier for equation (1). The ﬁrst order conditions and envelope conditions
are then the following:
c(κ,z,K,E,X,μ)
−σ = λ(κ,z,K,E,X,μ)
ϕ = λ(κ,z,K,E,X,μ)ru (z,K,E,X,μ)
λ(κ,z,K,E,X,μ)=βE [Bκ (κ0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0) | z]
Bκ(κ,z,K,E,X,μ)=λ(κ,z,K,E,X,μ)
£
1 − δ + rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
1.2 Establishment’s problem
The establishments’ Bellman equation is the following
W(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)= m a x
{f,h,k,n,v}
{ezsF (n,k)+pu (z,K,E,X,μ)f − pe (z,K,E,X,μ)h





q(z,K,E,X,μ,z0)W (s0,l 0,j0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0)Q(s,s0) | z
#)
subject to
n = l + h − f (4)
πnl ≤ f (5)
f ≤ l (6)
h ≤ j (7)
l0 = n (8)
j0 = v (9)
(K0,E0,X0,μ 0)=L(z,K,E,X,μ). (10)
2Let ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), α(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), χ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),a n dη(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) be the Lagrange mul-
tipliers for constraints (4)-(7), respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions and envelope conditions are then the following:
ezsFk [n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] ≤ rk (z,K,E,X,μ), (= if k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0)
pu (z,K,E,X,μ) − ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)+α(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − χ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
≤ 0, (= if f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0)
−pe (z,K,E,X,μ)+ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − η(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ 0, (= if h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0)





q(z,K,E,X,μ,z0)Wl (s0,l 0,j0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0)Q(s,s0) | z
#





q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)Wj (s0,l 0,j0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0)Q(s,s0) | z
#
≤ 0, (= if v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0)
α(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − πnl]=0
χ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[l − f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0
η(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[j − h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0
Wl(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − πnα(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)+χ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
Wj(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=η(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
1.3 Recruitment company’s problem
The Bellman equation of the recruitment company is:
R(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)= m a x
{a,b,d,u}
{pe (z,K,E,X,μ)d + pv (z,K,E,X,μ)b
+pu (z,K,E,X,μ)[x + e − d − u]+ru (z,K,E,X,μ)u − a
+E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)R(e0,x 0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0) | z]}
3subject to
d ≤ (1 − πu)e (11)
b = H(a,u,A,U)
e0 = G(a,u,A,U)
x0 = u − G(a,u,A,U)
A = A(z,K,E,X,μ)
U = U (z,K,E,X,μ)
(K0,E0,X0,μ 0)=L(z,K,E,X,μ).
Let ς (e,x,z,K,E,X,μ) be the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (11). The ﬁrst order conditions and envelope conditions
are then the following:
1=pv (z,K,E,X,μ)Ha(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A,U)
+E [q(z,K,E,X,μ,z0)Re (e0,x 0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0)Ga(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A,U) | z]
−E [q(z,K,E,X,μ,z0)Rx (e0,x 0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0)Ga(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A,U) | z]
0=pv (z,K,E,X,μ)Hu(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ) − pu (z,K,E,X,μ)+ru (z,K,E,X,μ)
+E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)Re (e0,x 0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0)Gu(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A,U) | z]
+E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)Rx (e0,x 0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0) | z]
−E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)Rx (e0,x 0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0)Gu(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A,U) | z]
pe (z,K,E,X,μ) − pu (z,K,E,X,μ) − ς (e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)=0
ς (e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)[(1− πu)e − d(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0
Re (e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)=pu (z,K,E,X,μ)+( 1− πu)ς (e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)
Rx (e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)=pu (z,K,E,X,μ)
1.4 Conditions for a recursive competitive equilibrium (RCE)
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for {B, W, R, c, i, m, n, k, f, h, v, a, b, d, u, A, U, L, Π, rk, ru, pu, pe, pv,
q} to be a RCE is that there exist Lagrange multipliers λ(κ,z,K,E,X,μ), ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), α(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),
χ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),a n dη(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) such that equations (12)-(40) hold (equations 41 through 50 are merely
deﬁnitional).
c(κ,z,K,E,X,μ)




λ[(1 − δ)κ + i(κ,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)]
λ(κ,z,K,E,X,μ)
£





ezsFk [n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] ≤ rk (z,K,E,X,μ), (= if k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (14)
40=ru (z,K,E,X,μ) − pu(z,K,E,X,μ)
+pv (z,K,E,X,μ)Hu(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ))
+(1− πu)Gu(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ)) ×
E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)[pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))] | z]
+E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z] (15)
1=pv (z,K,E,X,μ)Ha(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ))
+(1− πu)Ga(a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ)) ×





q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)η(s0,n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
#




















≤ ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), (= if n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (18)
−pe (z,K,E,X,μ)+ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ η(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), (= if h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (19)
pu (z,K,E,X,μ) − ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)+α(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − χ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
≤ 0, (= if f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (20)
n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l + h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) (21)
h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ j (22)
πnl ≤ f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) (23)
f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ l (24)
η(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[j − h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0 (25)
α(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − πnl]=0 (26)
χ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[l − f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0 (27)
b(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)=H [a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ)] (28)
5d(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ (1 − πu)e (29)





















v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)μ(s,dl × dj)=b(E,X,z,K,E,X,μ) (35)


















+βE{ B [(1 − δ)κ + i(κ,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)] | z} (42)
W(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=ezsF [n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)]
+pu (z,K,E,X,μ)f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − pe (z,K,E,X,μ)h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)









+pu (z,K,E,X,μ)[x + e − d(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ) − u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)]
+ru (z,K,E,X,μ)u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ) − a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)
+E
⎡





























K0 =( 1− δ)K + i(K,z,K,E,X,μ) (46)
E0 = G[a(E,X,z,K,E,X,μ),u(E,X,z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ)] (47)






Q(s,s0)μ(s,dl × dj)+ ψ (s0)I (L×J) (49)
where
B(s,L×J)={(l,j):n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ∈ L and v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ∈ J} (50)
1.5 Equilibrium allocations and prices














+E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z]
+(1− πu)Gu(A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ)) ×
E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)[pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))] | z] (53)
1=pv (z,K,E,X,μ)Ha(A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ))
+(1− πu)Ga(A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ)) ×
E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)[pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))] | z] (54)





q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)η(s0,n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
#




















≤ ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), (= if n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (57)
−pe (z,K,E,X,μ)+ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ η(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), (= if h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (58)
pu (z,K,E,X,μ) − ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)+α(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − χ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
≤ 0, (= if f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (59)
n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l + h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) (60)
h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ j (61)
πnl ≤ f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) (62)
f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ l (63)
η(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[j − h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0 (64)
α(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − πnl]=0 (65)




h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)μ(s,dl × dj) ≤ (1 − πu)E (67)
0=[ pe (z,K,E,X,μ) − pu (z,K,E,X,μ)]
"

























v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)μ(s,dl × dj)=H [A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ)] (73)








f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)μ(s,dl × dj) (74)
(K0,E0,X0,μ 0)=L(z,K,E,X,μ) (75)
8is given by:
K0 =( 1− δ)K + i(K,z,K,E,X,μ) (76)
E0 = G[A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ),A(z,K,E,X,μ),U(z,K,E,X,μ)] (77)






Q(s,s0)μ(s,dl × dj)+ ψ (s0)I (L×J) (79)
2 Characterization of establishments’ decision rules
It will be convenient to truncate the establishments’ problem to a ﬁnite horizon T. The truncated problem is given by
Wt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)= m a x
{f,h,k,n,v}
{ezsF (n,k)+pu (z,K,E,X,μ)f − pe (z,K,E,X,μ)h





q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)Wt+1,T (s0,l 0,j0,z0,K0,E0,X0,μ 0)Q(s,s0) | z
#)
subject to
n ≤ l + h − f (80)
πnl ≤ f (81)
f ≤ l (82)
h ≤ j (83)
l0 = n (84)
j0 = v (85)
(K0,E0,X0,μ 0)=L(z,K,E,X,μ) (86)
for t =0 ,1,...,T,w h e r e
WT+1,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0 .
In what follows, it will be assumed that
E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z] ≤ pu (z,K,E,X,μ),
and that
pu (z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ pe (z,K,E,X,μ),
since these are properties that will be satisﬁed in equilibrium.
9Let ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), αt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), χt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),a n dηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) be the
(non-negative) Lagrange multipliers for constraints (80)-(83), respectively. From the ﬁrst-order and envelope conditions we
get for t =0 ,1,...,T, the following.
ezsFk [nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),k t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] ≤ rk (z,K,E,X,μ), (= if kt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (87)
nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l + ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) (88)
pu (z,K,E,X,μ) − ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)+αt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − χt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
≤ 0, (= if ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (89)
−pe (z,K,E,X,μ)+ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ 0, (= if ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (90)








l (s0,n t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
o








j (s0,n t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
o
≤ pv (z,K,E,X,μ), (= if vt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (92)
αt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − πnl]=0 (93)
χt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[l − ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0 (94)
ηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[j − ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0 (95)
W
t,T














t=0 be any sequence of functions satisfying that
E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z] ≤ ξt,T(0,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ pu (z,K,E,X,μ),f o rt<T
10and that




















for t =0 ,...,T, satisfy equations (87)-(99).
Proof. It is a straightforward veriﬁcation.
To simplify the subsequent analysis it will be convenient to deﬁne two functions ˆ k(n,z,s,r) and ˆ Fn (n,z,s,r) as follows.











Observe that ˆ Fn (n,z,s,r) is strictly decreasing, that limn→∞ ˆ Fn (n,z,s,r)=0 ,a n dt h a tlimn→0 ˆ Fn (n,z,s,r)=+ ∞.






nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l + ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) (101)
pu (z,K,E,X,μ) − ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)+αt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − χt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
≤ 0, (= if ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (102)























χt+1,T (s0,n t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
ª
+Q(s,0)E [q(z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z]











ηt+1,T (s0,n t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
ª
≤ pv (z,K,E,X,μ), (= if vt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0),f o rt<T (106)
vT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0 (107)
αt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − πnl]=0 (108)
χt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[l − ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0 (109)
ηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[j − ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0. (110)
Moreover, there is no loss of generality in assuming that
ηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m a x
©




αt,T(s,0,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=ξt,T(s,0,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − pe (z,K,E,X,μ) (113)
Proof. Equations (99)-(110) follow from equations (87)-(99), Lemma 1 and the fact that F satisﬁes the Inada conditions
(and therefore that nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0 and kt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0).
Need to show that ηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) can be restricted as in equation (111).
First, consider the case in which j>0.
If ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0, from equation (103) we have that
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − pe (z,K,E,X,μ)=ηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≥ 0,
where the inequality follows from the fact that ηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) is a Lagrange multiplier.
12If ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0 , from equations (103) and (110) we have that:
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − pe (z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ ηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0 .
Hence, when j>0, ηt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) must satisfy equation (111).
When j =0 , equation (110) imposes no restriction on ηt,T(s,l,0,z,K,E,X,μ). The only restrictions (from equations




t=0 must satisfy for t ≤ T that
ξt,T(s,l,0,z,K,E,X,μ) − pe (z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ ηt,T(s,l,0,z,K,E,X,μ),






ηt+1,T (s0,n t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),0,z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
ª
≤ pv (z,K,E,X,μ),f o r(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) such that vt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0 .
T h u st h e r ei sn ol o s so fg e n e r a l i t yi nr e s t r i c t i n gηt,T(s,l,0,z,K,E,X,μ) as in equation (111).
Finally, we need to show that χt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) can be restricted as in equation (112).
If l>0, equation (112) must hold because of equation (109) and because F satisﬁes the Inada conditions (and therefore
that nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0 and kt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0).
If l =0 , equation (109) imposes no restriction on χt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) and equation (108) imposes no restriction
on αt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ). Observe that equation (102) is satisﬁed under equations (112) and (113). Also, observe that
the variables
αt+1,T (s0,n t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))
and
χt+1,T (s0,n t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))
that enter equation (104) have nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0 (because F satisﬁes the Inada conditions) and therefore equa-
tions (112) and (113) do not apply to them.
Thus there is no loss of generality in assuming that equations (112) and (113) hold.






nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l + ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) (115)
















q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
#
+Q(s,0)E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z]











max[ξt+1,T (s0,n t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))
−pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),0]Q(s,s0) | z}
≤ pv (z,K,E,X,μ), (= if vt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0),f o rt<T (119)
vT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0 (120)
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≥ pu (z,K,E,X,μ) (121)
£
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − pu (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
[ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − πnl]=0 (122)
max
£
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − pe (z,K,E,X,μ),0
¤
[j − ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = 0 (123)
Moreover, there is no loss of generality in assuming that
ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)[ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − πnl]=0 . (124)
Proof. Equations (114)-(123) are a straigthward consequence of Lemma 2.
Need to show that ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) and ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) can be restricted as in equation (124).
First consider the case in which pe (z,K,E,X,μ) >p u (z,K,E,X,μ).
Suppose that ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0 and that ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) >π nl.
From equations (116) and (122)
pe (z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=pu (z,K,E,X,μ),
which is a contradiction. Hence, when pe (z,K,E,X,μ) >p u (z,K,E,X,μ), equation (124) must hold.
Now consider the case in which pe (z,K,E,X,μ)=pu (z,K,E,X,μ).
Suppose that ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0 and that ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) >π nl.
Observe, from equation (115), that
nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l + ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
14and, from equation (122), that:
pu (z,K,E,X,μ)=pe (z,K,E,X,μ)=ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) (125)
1) Suppose that ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≥− πnl.
Let
ˆ ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − l + πnl
ˆ ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=πnl
Observe that
l + ˆ ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ˆ ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),
that
ˆ ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − l + πnl
<n t,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − l + ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
= ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ j
and that
ˆ ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − l + πnl
= l + ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − l + πnl
≥ 0.
From equation (125) we then know that equations (114)-(124) hold.
2) Suppose that ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤− πnl.
Let
ˆ ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0
ˆ ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l − nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ).
Observe that
l + ˆ ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ˆ ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),
that
ˆ ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l − nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
= ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − ht,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≥ πnl
and that
ˆ ft,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l − nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) <l .
From equation (125) we then know that equations (114)-(124) hold.
Lemma 4 considers the case in which t = T.









Proof. Since j =0 , hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0and equations (116) and (123) impose no restrictions on ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,
X,μ). Moreover,
nT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=l − fT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) (126)
1) Consider the case that ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
≥ pu (z,K,E,X,μ).
Suppose that fT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) >π nl. Then, from equations (122), (118), (126), and the fact that ˆ Fn is strictly








(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
,
which is a contradiction. Then, fT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=πnl and
ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)= ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
≥ pu (z,K,E,X,μ).
2) Consider the case that ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
<p u (z,K,E,X,μ).
Suppose that fT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=πnl. Then, from equations (118) and (126),
ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)= ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
<p u (z,K,E,X,μ).
But this contradicts equation (121).
Hence, fT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) >π nl and, from equation (122),
ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=pu (z,K,E,X,μ) > ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
.









Proof. Since l =0 , fT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0and equation (122) imposes no restriction on ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ).
Moreover,
nT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0 (127)
because F satisﬁes the Inada conditions.





16Suppose that hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) <j . Then, from equations (123), (118), (127), (116) and the fact that ˆ Fn is




























But this contradicts equation (116).
Hence, hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) <jand from equations (116) and (123):
















































Suppose that hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0. Then, from Lemma 3, fT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=πnl.
From equations (116), (118) and the fact that ˆ Fn is strictly decreasing in its ﬁrst argument, we have that
pe (z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
= ˆ Fn
¡













(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¢
,
which contradict equation (128).
17Thus, hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0and equation (126) holds.




































Suppose that fT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) >π nl. Then, from Lemma 3, hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0 .
From equations (122) (118), the fact that pe (z,K,E,X,μ) ≥ pu (z,K,E,X,μ) and the fact that ˆ Fn is strictly decreasing
in its ﬁrst argument, we have that












(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¢
,
which contradict equation (129).
Thus, fT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=πnl and
nT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=( 1− πn)l + hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
Suppose that hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=0 .
Then, from equations (123) and (118),
pe (z,K,E,X,μ) ≥ ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)
= ˆ Fn
¡




(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¢
which contradicts equation (129). Hence, hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0
b.1) Consider the case that ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
≥ pe (z,K,E,X,μ).
Suppose that hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) <j . Then, from equations (116), (123), (118), and the fact that ˆ Fn is strictly








(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
,
18which contradicts equation (129). Then, hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=j and
ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)= ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
≥ pe (z,K,E,X,μ).
b.2) Consider the case that ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
<p e (z,K,E,X,μ).
Suppose that hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=j. Then, from equation (118) we have that
ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)= ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
<p e (z,K,E,X,μ).
But this contradicts equation (116).
Hence, hT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) <jand from equations (116) and (123):
ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=pe (z,K,E,X,μ) > ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
.










































Proof. I ff o l l o w sf r o mL e m m a s4 ,5 ,a n d6 .
The following assumption will be helpful in stating subsequent Lemmas.


























for some continuous function Λt,T that is strictly decreasing in its ﬁrst argument and strictly increasing in s.
Lemma 8 Let s>0, l + j>0. Suppose that ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) satisﬁes Assumption 2 and that




(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
.
Proof. a) Consider the case that j>0.
Suppose that ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) 6= Λt,T
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
.S i n c e ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) >
pe (z,K,E,X,μ) ≥ pu (z,K,E,X,μ), from Assumption 2 we have that
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=Λt,T
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
>p e (z,K,E,X,μ).
19But since Λt,T is strictly decreasing in its ﬁrst argument,
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=Λt,T
£











which contradicts Assumption 2.
b) Consider the case that j =0 .
Suppose that ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) 6= Λt,T
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
.S i n c e ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) >
pe (z,K,E,X,μ), from Assumption 2 the only possible value left is
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=pu (z,K,E,X,μ).
But ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) >p e (z,K,E,X,μ) ≥ pu (z,K,E,X,μ). A contradiction.






































Observe that the ﬁrst term of the min operator in equation (131) is greater than or equal to pe (z,K,E,X,μ). Therefore,
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) <p e (z,K,E,X,μ) ⇒
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=ξt,T(s,l,0,z,K,E,X,μ) <p e (z,K,E,X,μ)
Suppose now that ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≥ pe (z,K,E,X,μ). From equation (131) we know that
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ ξt,T(s,l,0,z,K,E,X,μ).
Hence,
pe (z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) ⇒ pe (z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ ξt,T(s,l,0,z,K,E,X,μ).
Observe from equation (119) that for t<T, vt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) depends on (s,l,j) only through s and nt,T(s,l,j,z,
K,E,X,μ). This motivates the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 10 Let t<Tand suppose that ξt+1,T satisﬁes Assumption 2. For every n ≥ 0 and s>0 (implicitely) deﬁne






max[ξt+1,T (s0,n,ˆ vt,T(n,s,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),0]Q(s,s0) | z
ª
≤ pv (z,K,E,X,μ), (= if ˆ vt,T(n,s,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (132)
20The following deﬁnition will help characterize ˆ vt,T.







max[ξt+1,T (s0,0, ¯ vt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),0]Q(s,s0) | z
ª
= pv (z,K,E,X,μ) (133)
From Assumption 2 and Lemma 8, observe that ¯ vt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) > 0 is uniquely determined.





¯ vt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) − (1 − πn)n,i f(1 − πn)n ≤ ¯ vt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)





Proof. It is a direct consequence of Assumption 2, Lemma 8, Deﬁnition 10 and Deﬁnition 11.
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max[ξt+1,T (s0,n,0,z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),0]Q(s,s0) | z
ª
. (135)
21where the ﬁrst equality follows from Deﬁnition 11, the second equality follows from Lemmas 8 and 12, the inequality follows
from Lemma 8 and Assumption 2 (in particular, the fact that Λt+1,T is strictly decreasing in its ﬁrst argument), and the
last equality follows from Lemma 8.
b) If (1 − πn)n>¯ vt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ),f r o mL e m m a1 2w eh a v et h a tˆ vt,T(n,s,z,K,E,X,μ)=0 . From Deﬁnition 10







max[ξt+1,T (s0,n,0,z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),0]Q(s,s0) | z
ª
. (136)
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⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬





q(z,K,E,X,μ,z0)min[ξt+1,T (s0,n,0,z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),p e (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))]Q(s,s0) | z
)
.(137)
Proof. Observe that for any positive numbers a and b :
a =m a x{a − b,0} +m i n{a,b}. (138)
Hence,
ξt+1,T (s0,n,ˆ vt,T(n,s,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))
=m a x [ ξt+1,T (s0,n,ˆ vt,T(n,s,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),0]
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q(z,K,E,X,μ,z0)min[ξt+1,T (s0,n,0,z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),p e (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))]Q(s,s0) | z
)
.
where the ﬁrst equality follows from equation (138), and the second equality follows from Lemmas 9 and 13.
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(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤












(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
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q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
#
+Q(s,0)E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z] (141)






+( 1− πn)Ωt,T (n,s,z,K,E,X,μ)+Ψ(z,K,E,X,μ) (142)
23is strictly decreasing in n.
Also, from Deﬁnition 10, observe that nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) and vt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) in equation (119) satisfy
that
vt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=ˆ vt,T [nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),s,z,K,E,X,μ].
Using Lemma 14 and following exactly the same arguments as in the proofs of Lemmas 4, 5 and 6 (with equation




and equation (117) taking the place of equation (118)) then leads to
equation (139).
Lemma 16 For t =0 ,...,T − 1, ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) satisﬁes equation (139) for every s>0 and l + j>0.M o r e o v e r ,
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) is decreasing in l and j.
Proof. From Lemma 7, ξT,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) satisﬁes Assumption 2 (with ˆ Fn playing the role of ΛT,T). The claim then
follows by induction.
Lemma 17 Let t ≤ T − 1 and s>0.D e ﬁne nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ ¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) as follows:













+(1− πn)Ωt,T (¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ),s,z,K,E,X,μ)+Ψ(z,K,E,X,μ), (144)








(1 − πn)l + j,nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)
ª





Proof. From Lemma (16), ξt,T satisﬁes equation (139)







+.(1 − πn)Ωt,T (nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),s,z,K,E,X,μ)
+Ψ(z,K,E,X,μ). (146)
a) Suppose that (1 − πn)l>n t,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ). Then, since ˆ Fn is strictly decreasing in n and Ωt,T is decreasing in
n,w eh a v et h a t
ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤








(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤














(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤






a.1) Suppose that ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
+(1− πn)Ωt,T ((1 − πn)l,s,z,K,E,X,μ)+Ψ(z,K,E,X,μ) >
pu (z,K,E,X,μ).




(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
+( 1− πn)Ωt,T ((1 − πn)l,s,z,K,E,X,μ)+Ψ(z,K,E,X,μ).
From equations (146) and (144), and using that ˆ Fn is strictly decreasing in n and that Ωt,T is decreasing in n,w eh a v e
that
nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=( 1− πn)l<¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ). (148)
a.2) Suppose that ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
+(1− πn)Ωt,T ((1 − πn)l,s,z,K,E,X,μ)+Ψ(z,K,E,X,μ) ≤
pu (z,K,E,X,μ).
Then, from equation (147),
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=pu (z,K,E,X,μ).
From equations (146) and (143), and using that ˆ Fn is strictly decreasing in n and that Ωt,T is decreasing in n,w eh a v e
that
nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ (1 − πn)l. (149)
From equations (148) and (149) we then have that
(1 − πn)l>n t,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) ⇒ nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m i n{(1 − πn)l,¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)}. (150)
b) Suppose that (1 − πn)l ≤ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ). Then, since ˆ Fn is strictly decreasing in n and Ωt,T is decreasing in
n,w eh a v et h a t
ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤





(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
+( 1− πn)Ωt,T ((1 − πn)l,s,z,K,E,X,μ)+Ψ(z,K,E,X,μ)
≥ ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤




(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤







(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤














(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤





b.1) Suppose that ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
+(1 − πn)Ωt,T ((1 − πn)l + j,s,z,K,E,X,μ)+Ψ(z,K,E,X,
μ) >p e (z,K,E,X,μ).




(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
+( 1− πn)Ωt,T ((1 − πn)l + j,s,z,K,E,X,μ)+Ψ(z,K,E,X,μ).
From equations (146) and (143), and using that ˆ Fn is strictly decreasing in n and that Ωt,T is decreasing in n,w eh a v e
that
nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=( 1− πn)l + j<n t,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ). (152)
b.2) Suppose that ˆ Fn
£
(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
+(1 − πn)Ωt,T ((1 − πn)l + j,s,z,K,E,X,μ)+Ψ(z,K,E,X,
μ) ≤ pe (z,K,E,X,μ).
Then, from equation (151),
ξt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=pe (z,K,E,X,μ).
From equations (146) and (143), and using that ˆ Fn is strictly decreasing in n and that Ωt,T is decreasing in n,w eh a v e
that
nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ (1 − πn)l + j. (153)
From equations (152) and (153) we then have that
(1 − πn)l ≤ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) ⇒ nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m i n
©
(1 − πn)l + j,nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)
ª
. (154)
c) Need to show that equation (145) holds.
c.1) Consider the case that
min
©
(1 − πn)l + j,nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)
ª
< min{(1 − πn)l, ¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)}. (155)
Suppose that (1 − πn)l ≤ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ).




(1 − πn)l + j,nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)
ª
< (1 − πn)l.
But (1 − πn)l ≤ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) and j ≥ 0. A contradiction.
Thus, (1 − πn)l>n t,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) and from equation (150) we conclude that
nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m i n{(1 − πn)l, ¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)} > min
©
(1 − πn)l + j,nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)
ª
.
26c.2) Consider the case that
min
©
(1 − πn)l + j,nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)
ª
> min{(1 − πn)l, ¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)}. (156)
Suppose that (1 − πn)l>n t,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ).
Since j ≥ 0, it follows that (1 − πn)l + j>n t,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ). Hence, equation (156) becomes
nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) > min{(1 − πn)l, ¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)}.
But nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) ≤ ¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) and (1 − πn)l>n t,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ). A contradiction.
Thus, (1 − πn)l ≤ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) and from equation (154) we conclude that
nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m i n
©
(1 − πn)l + j,nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)
ª
> min{(1 − πn)l, ¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)}.
c.3) Consider the case that
min
©
(1 − πn)l + j,nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)
ª
=m i n{(1 − πn)l, ¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)}.
Equations (150) and (154) then imply that
nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m i n
©
(1 − πn)l + j,nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)
ª
=m i n{(1 − πn)l, ¯ nt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ)}.
From cases c1), c2) and c3), we conclude that equation (145) holds.






max[ξt+1,T (s0,0, ¯ vt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),0]Q(s,s0) | z
ª
= pv (z,K,E,X,μ) (157)
Then,
vt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m a x{¯ vt,T(s,z,K,E,X,μ) − (1 − πn)nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),0}
where nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) is given by equation (145).
Proof. By Lemma (16), ξt+1,T satisﬁes Assumption 2. Therefore, Lemma (12) applies. The claim then follows from
Lemma (17) and the fact that
vt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=ˆ vt,T [nt,T(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),s,z,K,E,X,μ].
Lemma 19 Let ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) be the Lagrange mulplier function for the establishments’ problem with inﬁnite plan-
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(1 − πn)l + j,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤












(1 − πn)l,z,s,rk (z,K,E,X,μ)
¤
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max[ξ (s0,n,0,z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),0]Q(s,s0) | z},
pv (z,K,E,X,μ)
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬













q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
#
+Q(s,0)E [q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)pu (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z] (160)
Moreover, ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) is decreasing in l and j.
Proof. The claim follows from Lemma 16 and the fact that limT→∞ ξ0,T = ξ and that limT→∞ ξ1,T = ξ (see Easley and
Spulber (1)).
Lemma 20 Let n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ), k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) and v(s,l,j,z,
K,E,X,μ) be optimal decision rules for the establishments’ problem with inﬁnite planning horizon (i.e. for T = ∞). Let
ξ(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) be given by equation (158), Ω(n,s,z,K,E,X,μ) be given by equation (159) and Ψ(z,K,E,X,μ) be
given by equation (160).
Deﬁne n(s,z,K,E,X,μ), ¯ n(s,z,K,E,X,μ) and ¯ v(s,z,K,E,X,μ) as follows:















max[ξ (s0,0, ¯ v(s,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)) − pe (z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)),0]Q(s,s0) | z}
= pv (z,K,E,X,μ)





min{(1 − πn)l + j,n(s,z,K,E,X,μ)}





h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m a x{n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − l,0}
28f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m a x{l − n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),0}
ezsFk [n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)] = rk (z,K,E,X,μ),
v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=m a x{¯ v(s,z,K,E,X,μ) − (1 − πn)n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),0}.
Proof. It is a direct consequence of Lemma 3, Lemma 16, Lemma 17, Lemma 18, Lemma 19 and the fact that limT→∞ ξ0,T =
ξ, limT→∞ ξ1,T = ξ, limT→∞ n0,T = n, limT→∞ v0,T = v (see Easley and Spulber (1)).
3 Finding a RCE
3.1 The myopic social planner’s problem
The problem of the myopic social planner facing a stochastic process
³
ˆ A, ˆ U,ˆ L
´
is given by the following Bellman equation:


























v(s,l,j)μ(s,dl × dj) ≤ H
³
A,U, ˆ A, ˆ U
´
(163)












h(s,l,j)μ(s,dl × dj) ≤ (1 − πu)E (165)
n(s,l,j)=l + h(s,l,j) − f (s,l,j) (166)
h(s,l,j) ≤ j (167)
πnl ≤ f (s,l,j) (168)
f (s,l,j) ≤ l (169)
K0 =( 1− δ)K + I
E0 = G
³
A,U, ˆ A, ˆ U
´
X0 = U − G
³






{(l,j): n(s,l,j)∈L and v(s,l,j)∈J}
Q(s,s0)μ(s,dl × dj)+ ψ (s0)I (L×J)
ˆ A = ˆ A
³
z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
ˆ U = ˆ U
³
z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
29³





z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
.
The MSP’s decision rules are C = Cm
³
z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, I = Im
³
z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, n = nm(s,l,j,z,
K, E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), k = km
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, f = fm
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, h = hm(s,l,j,
z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), v = vm
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, U = Um(z,K,E,X, μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), A = Am(z,K, E,
X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ).
3.2 Solution to MSP’s problem
The necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a solution {Cm,Im,n m,km,fm,h m,vm,Um,A m} to the MSP’s problem with ex-
ogenous stochastic process
³
ˆ A, ˆ U,ˆ L
´
is that there exist Lagrange multipliers λ
m(z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), rk,m(z,K,E,X,
μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), pv,m(z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), pu,m
³
z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, pe,m(z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) − pu,m(z,
K, E, X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), ξ
m
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
, ηm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), αm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,
ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) and χm
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
























z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
h
1 − δ + rk,m
³








nm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ),k m
³
































z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´






z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´












































z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´ pu,m
³














z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´






z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´

















































z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´ Q(s,s0)×
ηm(s0,n m(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ),vm
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
















nm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ),km
³























s0,n m(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ),vm
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´

























s0,n m(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ),vm
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´

























s0,n m(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ),vm
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´

















z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
+ ξ
m(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ)











z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
− ξ
m(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ)+αm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ)


































s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
≤ l (182)




s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´i
=0 (183)





















s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´









z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´i
"





























nm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ),km
³
s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´i






s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´













z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
,Um(z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), ˆ A, ˆ U
i
(190)















s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
μ(s,dl × dj) (191)
K0 =( 1− δ)K + Im
³







z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
,Um(z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), ˆ A, ˆ U
i
(193)




z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´














s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
∈ L and vm
³





ˆ A = ˆ A
³
z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
(197)
ˆ U = ˆ U
³









z, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
. (199)
323.3 Characterization of myopic planner’s decision rules
Proposition 21 Let {Cm,Im,n m,k m,fm,h m,vm,Um,A m} b et h es o l u t i o nt ot h eM S P ’ sw i t he x o g e n o u ss t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s s
³
ˆ A, ˆ U,ˆ L
´
. Then, there exist thresholds nm(s,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ), ¯ nm(s,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) and ¯ vm(s,z,K,E,X,
μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) and a shadow capital price function rk
³
z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
such that, for every s>0 and l + j>0:
















vm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ)
=m a x
n
¯ vm(s,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) − (1 − πn)nm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ),0
o
.
hm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ)=m a x
n
nm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ) − l,0
o
fm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ)=m a x
n








z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ
´
,
Proof. In the economy in which
³
ˆ A, ˆ U,ˆ L
´
trully represent exogenous productivity shocks to the recruitment technology the
Welfare Theorems apply. In this case the problem described in Section 3.1 is the social planner’s problem and its solution can
be descentralized as a recursive competitive equilibrium in which prices are functions of the state (z,K,E,X,μ, ˆ K, ˆ E, ˆ X,ˆ μ).
The claim then follows from analyzing the associated establishments’ problem using identical arguments as those in the
proof of Proposition 20.
3.4 Construction of a RCE
Proposition 22 Let {Cm,Im,n m,k m,fm,h m,vm,Um,A m} b et h es o l u t i o nt ot h eM S P ’ sw i t he x o g e n o u ss t o c h a s t i cp r o c e s s
³




ˆ A(z,K,E,X,μ)=Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ), (200)
ˆ U (z,K,E,X,μ)=Um (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ), (201)
and that
³
ˆ K0, ˆ E0, ˆ X0, ˆ μ
0
´
= ˆ L(z,K,E,X,μ) (202)
satisfy the following conditions:
ˆ K0 =( 1− δ)K + Im (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ), (203)
ˆ E0 = G[Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),
Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)], (204)







Q(s,s0)μ(s,dl × dj)+ ψ (s0)I (L×J), (206)
where
B(s,L×J)={(l,j):nm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) ∈ L and vm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) ∈ J}. (207)









Proof. Since {Cm,Im,n m,km,fm,h m,vm,Um,A m} is a solution to the MSP’s problem with exogenous stochastic process
³
ˆ A, ˆ U,ˆ L
´
we know that there exist Lagrange multipliers
©
λ
m,rk,m,p v,m,p u,m,p e,m − pu,m,ξ
m,ηm,α m,χ mª
such that equa-



















1 − δ + rk,m
³






≤ rk,m (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ), (= if km (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (210)
340=ϕλ
m (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)
−1 − pu,m (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)
+pv,m(z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)Hu [Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um(z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),
Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)]
+(1− πu)Gu [Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um(z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),












































+(1− πu)Ga [Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um(z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),










































z0, ˆ L(z,K,E,X,μ), ˆ L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z
o


















m (s0,n m(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),vm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),




































z0, ˆ L(z,K,E,X,μ), ˆ L(z,K,E,X,μ)) | z
o
≤ ξ
m (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ), (= if nm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (214)
−pe,m (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)+ξ
m(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)
≤ ηm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)( =if hm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (215)
pu,m (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) − ξ
m(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)+αm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)
−χm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) ≤ 0( =if fm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) > 0) (216)
nm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)=l + hm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)
−fm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) (217)
hm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) ≤ j (218)
πnl ≤ fm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) (219)
fm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) ≤ l (220)
ηm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)[j − hm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)] = 0 (221)
αm(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)[fm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) − πnl]=0 (222)




hm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)μ(s,dl × dj) ≤ (1 − πu)E (224)
0=[ pe,m (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ) − pu,m (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)]
"




hm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)μ(s,dl × dj)
#
(225)













vm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)μ(s,dl × dj) (228)
= H [Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um(z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),
Am (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ),Um (z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)] (229)
































































hm (s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ,K,E,X,μ)μ(s,dl × dj)






+βE{ B [(1 − δ)κ + i(κ,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ)] | z}
W(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)=ezsF [n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),k(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)]
+pu (z,K,E,X,μ)f(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ) − pe (z,K,E,X,μ)h(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ)





q (z,K,E,X,μ,z0)W (s0,n(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),v(s,l,j,z,K,E,X,μ),z0,L(z,K,E,X,μ))Q(s,s0) | z
#
R(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)=pe (z,K,E,X,μ)d(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)+pv (z,K,E,X,μ)b(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)
+pu (z,K,E,X,μ)[x + e − d(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ) − u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)]
+ru (z,K,E,X,μ)u(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ) − a(e,x,z,K,E,X,μ)
+E
⎡
























⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
Using these deﬁnitions, the homogeneity of degree one of H and G with respect to (a,u), and the homogeneity of degreee
zero of H and G with respect to (A,U), equations (200)-(207) together with equations (208)-(230) imply equations (12)-(50).
384 Steady state equilibrium
4.1 Steady state conditions
In order to compute a recursive competitive equilibrium it will be ﬁrst necessary to compute a steady state equilibrium for
the deterministic version of the economy, i.e. one in which the aggregate productivity level z is equal to zero. This section
describes the conditions that such steady state equilibrium must satisfy. Using equations (51)-(79), Lemma (19), Lemma





































pe = ˆ Fn [n(s),s,r]+( 1− πn)Ω(n(s),s)+Ψ, (235)




β max[ξ (s0,0, ¯ v(s)) − pe,0]Q(s,s0) (237)
n(s,l,j)=m a x{min{(1 − πn)l + j,n(s)},min{(1 − πn)l,¯ n(s)}} (238)
h(s,l,j)=m a x{n(s,l,j) − l,0} (239)
f(s,l,j)=m a x{l − n(s,l,j),0} (240)
sFk [n(s,l,j),k(s,l,j)] = r, (241)
v(s,l,j)=m a x{¯ v(s) − (1 − πn)n(s,l,j),0}. (242)
pu = ϕcσ + pvHu(A,U,A,U)+βpu +( 1− πu)Gu(A,U,A,U)β [pe − pu] (243)




h(s,l,j)μ(s,dl × dj) ≤ (1 − πu)G[A,U,A,U] (245)
0=[ pe − pu]
"














n(s,l,j)μ(s,dl × dj)+U =1 (248)








k(s,l,j)μ(s,dl × dj)=K (250)
E = G[A,U,A,U] (251)






Q(s,s0)μ(s,dl × dj)+ ψ (s0)I (L×J) (253)
Observe from Lemma (22) that if {Cm,Im,n m,k m,fm,h m,vm,Um,A m} is a solution to the MSP’s with exogenous
stochastic process
³
ˆ A, ˆ U,ˆ L
´
, conditions (200)-(207) are satisﬁed, z is identical to zero, and the aggregate state (K,E,X,μ)
is constant over time, then equations (231)-(253) must hold.
4.2 Invariant distribution
The following Lemma characterizes a support to the invariant distribution μ that satisﬁes equation (253).1
Lemma 23 Let M be a natural number satisfying that
(1 − πn)
M max{¯ n(smax), ¯ v(smax)} < min{n(smin), ¯ v(smin)}. (254)










k n(s),(1 − πn)















is a support of the invariant distribution μ.
Proof. From equations (238) and (242) we know that an establishment of type (s,l,j) transits to a next-period type
(s0,l 0,j0),w i t hs0 randomly determined,
l0 = n(s,l,j), (255)
and





1In the statement of the lemma smax and smin denote the largest and smallest positive values for s, respectively.
40Since establishments are created with (l,j)=( 0 ,0), P(0) describes the set of all possible types (s,l,j) of establisments of
zero age.
Deﬁne
N (0) = {0}.
Since n(s,l,j)=0whenever (l,j)=( 0 ,0), N(0) describes the set of all possible employment levels of establishments of zero
age.
Starting from N(0),d e ﬁne recursively a sequence of sets P(m) and N (m) as follows:
P(m) =
½
















n: n =( 1− πn)nm−1 for some nm−1 ∈ N(m−1)
o
,
for m =1 ,2,...,∞.
From equations (238), (242), (255) and (256) we know that P(m) contains the set of all possible types (s,l,j) of
establishments of age m,a n dt h a tN (m) contains the set of all possible employment levels of establishments of age m.2










k n(s),(1 − πn)




for m =1 ,2,...,∞.
A direct consequence of equation (257) is that N(m−1) ⊂ N (m), for every m ≥ 1.T h u s ,t h es e tN(m) in fact contains
all the possible employment levels of establishments of age m or younger. Moreover,




m−1 n(s),(1 − πn)




for m =1 ,2,...,∞,w h e r e“ /” denotes set diﬀerence.
In what follows it will be shown that there exists a M<∞ such that N(M) contains the set of all possible employment
levels of establishments of all ages m =0 ,1,...,∞.T op r o v et h i si ts u ﬃces to show that there exists a M<∞ such that no
establishment of age M +1will choose an employment level in the set N (M+1)/N (M), i.e. all establishments of age M +1
will choose an employment level in the set N(M).3
Let M satisfy equation (254). Since 0 <π n < 1,s u c haM exists.
Let (s,l,j) ∈ P(M+1).
Suppose that n(s,l,j) ∈ N (M+1)/N (M).S i n c eN (M+1)/N (M) satisﬁes equation (258), and M satisﬁes equation (254),
it follows that
n(s,l,j) ≤ (1 − πn)
M max{¯ n(smax), ¯ v(smax)} < min{n(smin), ¯ v(smin)}. (259)
2Observe that the “max” and “min” operators in equation (238) have been disregarded in the construction of the sets P(m) and N(m).T h u s ,
the set of actual types of establishments of age m and the set of actual employment levels of establishments of age m are smaller than P(m) and
N(m), respectively.
3This condition is suﬃcient because whenever an establishment reaches age M +1 , its age can be reset to M without consequence. This
procedure can be repeated an inﬁnite number of times.
41Also, since n(s,l,j) satisﬁes equation (238) and (s,l,j) ∈ P(M+1),w eh a v et h a t







From equation (260) and the last inequality in equation (259), we then have that
n(s,l,j)=( 1− πn)l.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that j =0 .
Suppose that some establishment of age M transits to (s,l,j). From equation (256), this implies that
0=m a x{¯ v(s−1) − (1 − πn)l,0},
for some s−1 ∈ S.
But, from equation (259)
n(s,l,j)=( 1− πn)l<¯ v(s−1),
for all s−1 ∈ S. A contradiction.
Hence, (s,l,j) ∈ P(M+1) does not correspond to an establishment of age M +1 .
Suppose now that j>0.
Let s−1 be such that (1 − πn)l + j =¯ v(s−1) (since (s,l,j) ∈ P(M+1),s u c ha ns−1 exists).
Then, from equation (238) we have that
n(s,l,j)=m a x{min{¯ v(s−1),n(s)},min{(1 − πn)l,¯ n(s)}},
and, therefore, that
n(s,l,j)=( 1− πn)l ≤ ¯ n(s) and n(s,l,j)=( 1− πn)l ≥ min{¯ v(s−1),n(s)}. (261)
The second inequality in equation (261) contradicts equation (259).
We conclude that no establishment of age M +1chooses an employment level in the set N (M+1)/N (M). It follows that
the set P(M+1) is a support of the invariant distribution μ.
4.3 Steady state computational algorithm
This section describes the algorithm used to compute a steady state equilibrium. It will be convenient to do so under the
functional forms that will be used later on. In particular, the production function F is here assumed to have the following
form:
F (n,k)=nγkθ, (262)
where γ>0, θ>0,a n dγ + θ<1. Observe that under this functional form Fk becomes
Fk (n,k)=θnγkθ−1 (263)












Lemmas 24-26 provide certain homogeneity results that will be used in the computational algorithm.
Lemma 24 Suppose that F is given by equation (262). Let ξ(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), Ω(n,s;pu,p e,p v), Ψ(pu), n(s;pu,p e,p v),
¯ n(s;pu,p e,p v), ¯ v(s;pu,p e,p v), n(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), h(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), f(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), k(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), v(s,l,j;pu,p e,
















γ+θ−1n(s;pu,p e,p v) (268)
¯ n(s;λpu,λp e,λp v)=λ
1−θ
γ+θ−1 ¯ n(s;pu,p e,p v) (269)
¯ v(s;λpu,λp e,λp v)=λ
1−θ



































γ+θ−1v(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v) (275)
for every λ>0.
Proof. The claim follows from guessing and verifying equations (265)-(275) in equations (232)-(242).
Lemma 25 Suppose that F is given by equation (262). Let μ(pu,p e,p v) be the invariant distribution that satisﬁes equation
(253) and P (pu,p e,p v) be the ﬁnite support in Lemma 23, when prices are given by (pu,p e,p v). Then, for every λ>0,








∈ P (λpu,λp e,λp v) (276)
and









Proof. Equation (276) is a direct consequence of Lemmas 23 and 24.
From Lemma 23, observe that equation (253) can be written as follows. For every (s0,l 0,j0) ∈ P (pu,p e,p v),





Q(s,s0)μ(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v)+ ψ (s0)I (l0,j0), (277)
where
B(s,l0,j0;pu,p e,p v)={(l,j):( s,l,j) ∈ P (pu,p e,p v), n(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v)=l0 and v(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v)=j0}, (278)
43and where I (l0,j0)=1if (l0,j0)=( 0 ,0),a n dI (l0,j0)=0 ,o t h e r w i s e .

















































































































:( s,l,j) ∈ P (pu,p e,p v),
n(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v)=l0 and v(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v)=j0}. (281)
















⇔ (l,j) ∈ B(s,l0,j0;pu,p e,p v) (282)






























+  ψ (s0)I (l0,j0).









= μ(s0,l 0,j0;pu,p e,p v).
Lemma 26 Suppose that F is given by equation (262). Let ξ(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), Ω(n,s;pu,p e,p v), Ψ(pu), n(s;pu,p e,p v),
¯ n(s;pu,p e,p v), ¯ v(s;pu,p e,p v), n(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), h(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), f(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), k(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v), v(s,l,j;pu, pe,
pv) be the solutions to equations (232)-(242), let μ(pu,p e,p v) be the invariant distribution that satisﬁes equation (253) and



















































sn(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v)γk(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v)θμ(s,dl × dj;pu,p e,p v)
Proof. We shall prove equation (283). The proofs for equations (284) and (287) are analogous.





























n(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v)μ(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v),


































n(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v)μ(s,l,j;pu,p e,p v),
which is equation (283).
Two computational algorithms will be described: One for the economy with no externalities and another for the economy
with externalities.
4.3.1 Algorithm for economy with no externalities



























































Therefore, equations (243), (244) and (247) become:
























{pv +( 1− πu)β [pe − pu]}
φ
1+φ − 1





The computational algorithm is given by the following steps.
Step 1: Fix pu
0 =1 .
Step 2: Choose some pe
0 ≥ pu
0 ( i ti sc o n v e n i e n tf o rt h eﬁrst choice to be pe
0 = pu
0).
Step 3: Choose some pv
0







0) that satisfy equations
(232)-(234) when j =0and prices are given by (pu
0,p e
0,p v
0). (This can be done through value function iterations).
Step 5: Solve for the function ξ(s,l,j;pu
0,p e
0,p v




0). (Observe that given the output of Step 4, this takes only one value function iteration).









0) that satisfy equations (235)-
(237) (This can be done through standard root ﬁnding methods),
















0) as in equations (238)-(242).
Step 8: Construct the ﬁnite support P (pu
0,p e
0,p v
0) as in Lemma 23.
Step 9: For every (s,l0,j0), construct the set B(s,l0,j0;pu
0,p e
0,p v

























































0 +( 1− πu)β [pe
0 − pu
0]
Find the factor λ>λ(pu
0,p e
0,p v














































46(This can be done using standard root ﬁnding methods)















RHS (λ)=0 , lim
λ→∞
RHS (λ)=1






0) that satisﬁes equation (288).
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0),o b s e r v et h a tU (pu
0,p e
0,p v
























































































































are equilibrium prices. (At this point, exit the algorithm).
Step 16: If conditions (289)-(290) are not satisﬁe d ,g ob a c kt oS t e p2w i t han e wg u e s sf o rpe
0 (the search for pe
0 can be
implemented within a standard root ﬁnding method).
4.3.2 Algorithm for economy with externalities


















































Therefore, equations (243), (244) and (247) become:






























The computational algorithm is given by the following steps.









Find the factor λ>λ(pu
0,p e
0,p v






































(This can be done using standard root ﬁnding methods)















RHS (λ)=0 , lim
λ→∞
RHS (λ)=1






0) that satisﬁes equation (291).
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Steps 14-16 are the same as in Section 4.3.1.
495O ﬀ-steady state dynamics
In this section it will be important to have separate notation for steady state variables. In particular, n∗, ¯ n∗,a n d¯ v∗ will
denote steady state threshold functions and μ∗ will denote the invariant distribution. From Lemma 23, we know that μ∗
has a ﬁnite support given by
P∗ =
½








































k ¯ v∗ (s)
o¾
∪ {0},
and where M is a natural number satisfying that
(1 − πn)
M max{¯ n∗ (smax), ¯ v∗ (smax)} < min{n∗ (smin), ¯ v∗ (smin)}. (292)
In order to analyze oﬀ-steady state dynamics it will be useful to deﬁne nt, ¯ nt,a n d¯ vt, as the threshold functions chosen
at date t. In addition, it will be useful to deﬁne the following minimum distance:
ε =m i n |a − b|, (293)
subject to
a,b ∈ D∗ and a 6= b,
where






M n∗ (s),(1 − πn)
M ¯ n∗ (s),(1 − πn)
M ¯ v∗ (s)
o¾
.
The following Lemma characterizes the distribution μt+1 under the assumptions that μt and the ﬁnite history of
thressholds
©
nt−k, ¯ nt−k, ¯ vt−k
ª
k=0,1,...,M are suﬃciently close to their steady-state values.
Lemma 27 Let M be deﬁned by equation (292) and ε by equation (293).
Suppose that
¯ ¯nt−k (s) − n∗ (s)
¯ ¯ <ε / 2, (294)
|¯ nt−k (s) − ¯ n∗ (s)| <ε / 2, (295)
|¯ vt−k (s) − ¯ v∗ (s)| <ε / 2 (296)
for every s and every 0 ≤ k ≤ M +1 .
Suppose that the distribution μt has a ﬁnite support Pt given by
Pt =
½








































k ¯ vt−k−2 (s)
o¾
∪ {0},
50In addition, suppose that for every (s,l,j) ∈ Pt:
μt (s,l,j)=μ∗ (s,l∗,j∗),
where (s,l∗,j∗) i st h eu n i q u ee l e m e n to fP∗ satisfying that |l − l∗| <ε / 2 and |j − j∗| <ε / 2+( 1− π)ε/2.
Then, the distribution μt+1 has a ﬁnite support Pt+1 given by
Pt+1 =
½








































k ¯ vt−k−1 (s)
o¾
∪ {0},
Moreover, for every (s,l,j) ∈ Pt+1:
μt+1 (s,l,j)=μ∗ (s,l∗,j∗)
where (s,l∗,j∗) i st h eu n i q u ee l e m e n to fP∗ satisfying that |l − l∗| <ε / 2 and |j − j∗| <ε / 2+( 1− π)ε/2.





min{(1 − πn}l + j,nt−k (s)






vt−k(s,l,j)=m a x{¯ vt−k (s) − (1 − πn)nt−k(s,l,j),0}, (298)
for k =0 ,1,...,M +1 .
a) We will ﬁrst show that Pt+1 is a support of the distribution μt+1.





M−1 nt−M (s),(1 − πn)
M−1 ¯ nt−M (s),(1 − πn)
M−1 ¯ vt−M−1 (s)
o
,
Bt+1 = {l0 : l0 =( 1− πn)l, for some l ∈ Nt/At}. (299)
Observe that




{nt (s), ¯ nt (s), ¯ vt−1 (s)}
¾
. (300)
To show that Pt+1 is a support of the distribution μt+1 it suﬃces to show that




{max[¯ vt (s0) − (1 − πn)nt (s,l,j),0]}
¾
∪ {0}. (301)
Let (s,l,j) ∈ Pt. Then,
s ∈ S, l ∈ Nt and j =m a x[ ¯ vt−1 (s0) − (1 − πn)l,0],f o rs o m es0 ∈ S. (302)





min{(1 − πn}l + j,nt (s)










min{max[¯ vt−1 (s0),(1 − πn)l],n t (s)}





for some s0 ∈ S.
As a consequence,
nt(s,l,j) ∈ {(1 − πn)l,¯ nt (s),n t (s), ¯ vt−1 (s0)}
for some s0 ∈ S.
From equations (299) and (300) we have that
l ∈ Nt/At⇒nt(s,l,j) ∈ Nt+1.
Suppose that l ∈ At. Without loss of generality assume that
l =( 1− πn)
M−1 nt−M (s00)
for some s00 ∈ S (the cases l =( 1− πn)
M−1 ¯ nt−M (s00) and l =( 1− πn)
M−1 ¯ vt−M−1 (s00) can be handled in exactly the
same way).























But from equation (292) and equations (294)-(296), we have that
(1 − πn)
M nt−M (s00) < (1 − πn)
M ¯ nt−M (s00)
≤ (1 − πn)
M ¯ nt−M (smax)
≤ ¯ vt−1 (smin)
≤ ¯ vt−1 (s0)
and that
(1 − πn)
M nt−M (s00) < (1 − πn)
M ¯ nt−M (s00)
≤ (1 − πn)
M ¯ nt−M (smax)
≤ nt (smin)
≤ nt (s)
< ¯ nt (s)











=m i n {¯ vt−1 (s0),n t (s)}.
Thus, from equation (300), nt(s,l,j) ∈ Nt+1.
From equation (298), observe that






{max[¯ vt (s0) − (1 − πn)nt (s,l,j),0]}
¾
.
Therefore, Pt+1 is a support of the distribution μt+1.
b) To prove the second part of the Proposition it will be convenient to deﬁne the following (one-to-one and onto)
functions.





where (s,l∗,j∗) i st h eu n i q u ee l e m e n to fP∗ satisfying that |l − l∗| <ε / 2 and |[(1 − πn)l + j] − [(1 − πn)l∗ + j∗]| <ε / 2.





where (s0,l ∗,j∗) is the unique element of P∗ satisfying that |l0 − l∗| <ε / 2 and |[(1 − πn)l0 + j0] − [(1 − πn)l∗ + j∗]| <ε / 2.




We need to show that for every (s0,l 0,j0) ∈ Pt+1:






Let (s0,l 0,j0) ∈ Pt+1.






t (l,j)) +  ψ (s0)I (l0,j0),
where





























To show that equation (306) holds, it then suﬃces to show that






=( 0 ,0), (307)
(s,l,j) ∈ Gt(l0,j0)= ⇒ (s,l∗
t (l,j),j∗






















is the inverse function of (l∗
t,j∗
t ).
b.1) Proof of equation (307).
It is a direct consequence of how l∗
t+1 and j∗
t+1 were deﬁned and equations (294)-(296).
b.2) Proof of equation (308).
Let (s,l,j) ∈ Gt(l0,j0). Then, (s,l,j) ∈ Pt,




min{(1 − πn)l + j,nt (s)}






(1 − πn)l0 + j0 =m a x{¯ vt (s),(1 − πn)l0}.
Observe that (s,l∗
t (l,j),j∗
t (l,j)) ∈ P∗,
n∗(s,l∗
t(l,j),j∗






t (l,j),n ∗ (s)}
min{(1 − πn)l∗








t (l,j)) + v∗(s,l∗
t(l,j),j∗
t (l,j))




|(1 − πn)l − (1 − πn)l∗
t(l,j)| <ε / 2,
|[(1 − πn)l + j] − [(1 − πn)l∗
t(l,j)+j∗
t (l,j)]| <ε / 2,
|nt (s) − n∗ (s)| <ε / 2,
and








t (l,j)) + v∗(s,l∗
t(l,j),j∗
t (l,j))] − [(1 − πn)l0 + j0]| <ε / 2. (311)















t (l,j)) ∈ P∗ it follows that
(s,l∗
t(l,j),j∗
t (l,j)) ∈ G∗(l∗
t+1(l0,j0),j∗
t+1(l0,j0)).
b.3) Proof of equation (309).
Let (s,l∗,j∗) ∈ G∗(l∗
t+1(l0,j0),j∗







min{(1 − πn)l∗ + j∗,n ∗ (s)}








t+1(l0,j0)=( 1 − πn)n∗ (s,l∗,j∗)+v∗(s,l∗,j∗) (314)
=m a x
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